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The affirmative’s securitizing logic manifests itself in a drive for certainty which causes endless violence

Burke, 7 (Senior Lecturer in International Relations at the University of New South Wales at Sydney, Anthony, Johns Hopkins University Press, Ontologies of War: Violence, Existence and Reason, Project Muse)

This essay develops a theory about the causes of war -- and thus aims to generate lines of action and critique for peace -- that cuts beneath analyses based either on a given sequence of events, threats, insecurities and political manipulation, or the play of institutional, economic or political interests (the 'military-industrial complex'). Such factors are important to be sure, and should not be discounted, but they flow over a deeper bedrock of modern reason that has not only come to form a powerful structure of common sense but the apparently solid ground of the real itself. In this light, the two 'existential' and 'rationalist' discourses of war-making and justification mobilised in the Lebanon war are more than merely arguments, rhetorics or even discourses. Certainly they mobilise forms of knowledge and power together; providing political leaderships, media, citizens, bureaucracies and military forces with organising systems of belief, action, analysis and rationale. But they run deeper than that. They are truth-systems of the most powerful and fundamental kind that we have in modernity: ontologies, statements about truth and being which claim a rarefied privilege to state what is and how it must be maintained as it is. I am thinking of ontology in both its senses: ontology as both a statement about the nature and ideality of being (in this case political being, that of the nation-state), and as a statement of epistemological truth and certainty, of methods and processes of arriving at certainty (in this case, the development and application of strategic knowledge for the use of armed force, and the creation and maintenance of geopolitical order, security and national survival). These derive from the classical idea of ontology as a speculative or positivistic inquiry into the fundamental nature of truth, of being, or of some phenomenon; the desire for a solid metaphysical account of things inaugurated by Aristotle, an account of 'being qua being and its essential attributes'.17 In contrast, drawing on Foucauldian theorising about truth and power, I see ontology as a particularly powerful claim to truth itself: a claim to the status of an underlying systemic foundation for truth, identity, existence and action; one that is not essential or timeless, but is thoroughly historical and contingent, that is deployed and mobilised in a fraught and conflictual socio-political context of some kind. In short, ontology is the 'politics of truth'18 in its most sweeping and powerful form. I see such a drive for ontological certainty and completion as particularly problematic for a number of reasons. Firstly, when it takes the form of the existential and rationalist ontologies of war, it amounts to a hard and exclusivist claim: a drive for ideational hegemony and closure that limits debate and questioning, that confines it within the boundaries of a particular, closed system of logic, one that is grounded in the truth of being, in the truth of truth as such. The second is its intimate relation with violence: the dual ontologies represent a simultaneously social and conceptual structure that generates violence. Here we are witness to an epistemology of violence (strategy) joined to an ontology of violence (the national security state). When we consider their relation to war, the two ontologies are especially dangerous because each alone (and doubly in combination) tends both to quicken the resort to war and to lead to its escalation either in scale and duration, or in unintended effects. In such a context violence is not so much a tool that can be picked up and used on occasion, at limited cost and with limited impact -- it permeates being. This essay describes firstly the ontology of the national security state (by way of the political philosophy of Thomas Hobbes, Carl Schmitt and G. W. F. Hegel) and secondly the rationalist ontology of strategy (by way of the geopolitical thought of Henry Kissinger), showing how they crystallise into a mutually reinforcing system of support and justification, especially in the thought of Clausewitz. This creates both a profound ethical and pragmatic problem. The ethical problem arises because of their militaristic force -- they embody and reinforce a norm of war -- and because they enact what Martin Heidegger calls an 'enframing' image of technology and being in which humans are merely utilitarian instruments for use, control and destruction, and force -- in the words of one famous Cold War strategist -- can be thought of as a 'power to hurt'.19 The pragmatic problem arises because force so often produces neither the linear system of effects imagined in strategic theory nor anything we could meaningfully call security, but rather turns in upon itself in a nihilistic spiral of pain and destruction. In the era of a 'war on terror' dominantly conceived in Schmittian and Clausewitzian terms,20 the arguments of Hannah Arendt (that violence collapses ends into means) and Emmanuel Levinas (that 'every war employs arms that turn against those that wield them') take on added significance. Neither, however, explored what occurs when war and being are made to coincide, other than Levinas' intriguing comment that in war persons 'play roles in which they no longer recognises themselves, making them betray not only commitments but their own substance'. 21 What I am trying to describe in this essay is a complex relation between, and interweaving of, epistemology and ontology. But it is not my view that these are distinct modes of knowledge or levels of truth, because in the social field named by security, statecraft and violence they are made to blur together, continually referring back on each other, like charges darting between electrodes. Rather they are related systems of knowledge with particular systemic roles and intensities of claim about truth, political being and political necessity. Positivistic or scientific claims to epistemological truth supply an air of predictability and reliability to policy and political action, which in turn support larger ontological claims to national being and purpose, drawing them into a common horizon of certainty that is one of the central features of past-Cartesian modernity. Here it may be useful to see ontology as a more totalising and metaphysical set of claims about truth, and epistemology as more pragmatic and instrumental; but while a distinction between epistemology (knowledge as technique) and ontology (knowledge as being) has analytical value, it tends to break down in action. The epistemology of violence I describe here (strategic science and foreign policy doctrine) claims positivistic clarity about techniques of military and geopolitical action which use force and coercion to achieve a desired end, an end that is supplied by the ontological claim to national existence, security, or order. However in practice, technique quickly passes into ontology. This it does in two ways. First, instrumental violence is married to an ontology of insecure national existence which itself admits no questioning. The nation and its identity are known and essential, prior to any conflict, and the resort to violence becomes an equally essential predicate of its perpetuation. In this way knowledge-as-strategy claims, in a positivistic fashion, to achieve a calculability of effects (power) for an ultimate purpose (securing being) that it must always assume. Second, strategy as a technique not merely becomes an instrument of state power but ontologises itself in a technological image of 'man' as a maker and user of things, including other humans, which have no essence or integrity outside their value as objects. In Heidegger's terms, technology becomes being; epistemology immediately becomes technique, immediately being. This combination could be seen in the aftermath of the 2006 Lebanon war, whose obvious strategic failure for Israelis generated fierce attacks on the army and political leadership and forced the resignation of the IDF chief of staff. Yet in its wake neither ontology was rethought. Consider how a reserve soldier, while on brigade-sized manoeuvres in the Golan Heights in early 2007, was quoted as saying: 'we are ready for the next war'. Uri Avnery quoted Israeli commentators explaining the rationale for such a war as being to 'eradicate the shame and restore to the army the "deterrent power" that was lost on the battlefields of that unfortunate war'. In 'Israeli public discourse', he remarked, 'the next war is seen as a natural phenomenon, like tomorrow's sunrise.' The danger obviously raised here is that these dual ontologies of war link being, means, events and decisions into a single, unbroken chain whose very process of construction cannot be examined. As is clear in the work of Carl Schmitt, being implies action, the action that is war. This chain is also obviously at work in the U.S. neoconservative doctrine that argues, as Bush did in his 2002 West Point speech, that 'the only path to safety is the path of action', which begs the question of whether strategic practice and theory can be detached from strong ontologies of the insecure nation-state. This is the direction taken by much realist analysis critical of Israel and the Bush administration's 'war on terror' Reframing such concerns in Foucauldian terms, we could argue that obsessive ontological commitments have led to especially disturbing 'problematizations' of truth. However such rationalist critiques rely on a one-sided interpretation of Clausewitz that seeks to disentangle strategic from existential reason, and to open up choice in that way. However without interrogating more deeply how they form a conceptual harmony in Clausewitz's thought -- and thus in our dominant understandings of politics and war -- tragically violent 'choices' will continue to be made The essay concludes by pondering a normative problem that arises out of its analysis: if the divisive ontology of the national security state and the violent and instrumental vision of 'enframing' have, as Heidegger suggests, come to define being and drive 'out every other possibility of revealing being', how can they be escaped? How can other choices and alternatives be found and enacted? How is there any scope for agency and resistance in the face of them? Their social and discursive power -- one that aims to take up the entire space of the political -- needs to be respected and understood. However, we are far from powerless in the face of them. The need is to critique dominant images of political being and dominant ways of securing that being at the same time, and to act and choose such that we bring into the world a more sustainable, peaceful and non-violent global rule of the political.

The alternative is to deterritorialize the 1AC through a historical and critical lens – rather than objectively approaching their threat discourse, we choose more diverse forms of analysis

Krause and Williams 97 (Keith Krause, professor of political science at the Graduate Institute on International and Development Studies, Michael C Williams, professor of international relations at the Graduate School of Public and International Affairs, “From Strategy to Security: Foundations of Critical Security Studies,” chapter 2 of Critical Security Studies, p 49-50)

The challenges to the conventional understanding of security and the object to be secured also necessitate an epistemological shift in the way security is to be understood and studied. What is involved is a shift in focus from abstract individualism and contractual sovereignty to a stress on culture, civilization, and identity; the role of ideas, norms, and values in the constitution of that which is to be secured; and the historical context within which this process takes place. Epistemologically, this involves moving away from the objectivist, rationalist approach of both neorealism and neoliberalism, and toward more interpretive modes of analysis. While these issues have gained some prominence in debates over the nature of regime theory and the study of international organizations, they have made little impact on security studies.51 This is clearly illustrated by Helga Haftendorn’s attempts to broaden the ambit of security studies. On method, she concludes that the goal of security studies is “to construct an empirically testable paradigm,” which involves defining the “set of observational hypotheses,” the “hard core of irrefutable assumptions,” and the “‘set of scope conditions’ that…are required for a ‘progressive’ research program.” Although she admits that “we might do well to follow [Robert] Keohane’s counsel to apply somewhat ‘softer,’ more interpretive standards,” there is little room in this approach for studying norm change and the role of ideational elements in *constituting* the historical context within which actors take specific decisions.52 Despite Haftendorn’s goal of incorporating new issues that are normatively driven, the subordination of normative and reflexive conceptions of agency to objectivist visions of method remains largely undisturbed, and she remains committed to the fact value distinction. To understand security from a broader perspective means to look at the ways in which the objects to be secured, the perceptions of threats to them, and the available means of securing them (both intellectual and material) have shifted over time.53 New threats emerge; new enemies are created; erstwhile fellow citizens become objects of hatred and violence; former enemies can be transformed into members of the same community. The status of Others is uncertain, needing to be deciphered and determined.54 To comprehend these processes requires an understanding of the problematics of security as constituted by self-reflexive historical practices. The knightly code of honor, for example, was both a central structuring practice of latemedieval conflict and a central object that was to be secured. Honor was an integral part of conflict in its genesis as well as its practice. To view the military conflict of the late-medieval world as a competition between instrumentally rational actors in the modern sense is to misunderstand it in both form and content.55 The shift to interpretive models of understanding (broadly conceived) also yields a different vision of the transformation of practices. As historically grounded, the practices of security become capable of conscious transformation through the process of critical reflection. No longer objective in the sense of a fixed reality that the analyst can only mirror, reality as the realm of subjective practices and structures becomes self-reflexive. This is most emphatically not to say that security studies needs to move away from studying the role of ideas, institutions, and instruments of organized violence in political life. In this respect, the continuing defenders of traditional strategic/security studies are correct (although this formulation will probably leave them uncomfortable). But if we are to understand these realities, we must take them more seriously than the abstractions of neorealism allow. We must grasp the genesis and structure of particular security problems as grounded in concrete historical conditions and practices, rather than in abstract assertions of transcendental rational actors and scientific methods. We must understand the genesis of conflicts and the creation of the dilemmas of security as grounded in reflexive practices rather than as the outcome of timeless structures.56

**Every affirmation is fundamentally a decision and an affirmation of a particular interpretation of what it means to decide – their attempt to elevate their particular method of decision to the status of metaphysics links to all of our offense and begs the question of their justification for exclusion**

**Dillon, 99** (Michael Dillon, professor of international relations at the University of Lancaster, PhD in philosophy, April 1999, “Another Justice,” published in Political Theory Volume 27 Number 2, page 157-8)

I wish to argue, in addition, that the condition of being-in-between is exemplified by the 'inter' of another international relations. Especially in the proximity of the Refugee, for example, there is an explicit manifestation of the advent of the claim of Justice. The traditional intersubjectivity of international relations defaults, through the way in which the advent of the Refugee always calls to presence the stranger in the self itself, into the intra of a plural and divided self. The figure of the sovereign subject so integral to traditional international thought falsely poses the key questions of the self, of origination and of Justice. There can be no sovereign point of departure. The law is always born from a broken law, justice from the absence of Justice. There is always a co-presence of the other in the same; such that every self is a hybrid. The origin, if it is to issue forth in anything, therefore, must always already come divided and incomplete. The advent of Justice and the possibility of politics arise only because that plethos is ineradicable. There is then no sovereign subject. The self is a divided self from a beginning that is itself incomplete. It is only by virtue of that very division, that very incompleteness, that the question of justice arises at all. Thought of another Justice is therefore a continuous displacement of normal justice, a radical discomfort to it. But I have first to note how normal justice understands its place before considering the taking place of Justice differently. At its simplest the normal model of justice-sometimes known as the distributive model-notes that any society is governed by rules.9 Normal models differ, however, according to how they account for the derivation of those rules, what those rules define as just and unjust, and who or what is empowered by them to make, execute, and interpret the law. The most basic of these rules establish the status and entitlements of those who belong to the community. Correspondingly, these rules also specify who is a stranger, outsider, or alien, and they sometimes make provision for how the alien is to be dealt with should she or he appear at, or cross, the threshold of the community. This, in its crudest terms, is distributive justice. The laws, which it specifies, establish a regime of justice that expresses the ethical beliefs and commitments of that community. More than that, they inaugurate them. Each juridical decision is in some way, great or small, a communal rededication of those beliefs. The law, then, does not merely make a decision or enact a will. It reinaugurates a sense of what it is to have a will and make a decision in that community, as well as to what ends and purposes these may be devoted.10 Such law has to come from somewhere. An official narrative of one form or another supports how the community came to have the law which it does, together with the means and manner by which it is to be interpreted and exercised. That narrative explains both the origins of the law and the way in which it has been handed down. God and covenants, immemorial traditions and social contracts are amongst the most favoured of these. Divine inspiration, the dictates of reason, or a common sense are then said to furnish the law with the secure foundation it is thought to require. Injustice for the normal model, it further follows, is a function of sin, or the breakdown of reason, or the failure to attend to the dictates of common sense. One way or another, each of these ruptures tends to be blamed upon the irruption of irregular passions and desires which the law was inaugurated to limit and control as the means of determining and dispensing justice in the first place. Injustice for the normal model, in short, is the abnormal which effects a breach in the very paternity of the law itself. It is what the normal model claims to keep at bay as distributive justice orders the affairs of the community. All thought of justice and politics must, of course, pass through thought. How could it be otherwise? We think justice in the way that we do because of the various forms through which it is established and distributed. We also think justice in the way that we do because of the way that we think. The thought of another Justice is necessarily dependent therefore upon a way of thinking other than that which has historically come to govern our diverse onto-theological traditions of justice. That other way of thinking has continuously to be contrasted with the thought that underlies distributive justice, so that the characteristic features of another Justice may be differentiated from those of the normal model. Two of the key points of difference concern the interpretation of Time and the interpretation of the Human. Each of these derives from what I call the return of the ontological in continental thought.

### Ag

US won’t adopt Cuban model

Pfeiffer, 3 – energy editor for From the Wilderness (Dale, “Cuba-A Hope”, From the Wilderness,

<http://www.fromthewilderness.com/free/ww3/120103_korea_2.html>.

Resistance to Cuban-style agricultural reform would be particularly stiff in the United States. Agribusiness will not allow all of its holdings and power to be expropriated. Nor is the U.S. government interested in small farms and organic agriculture. The direction of U.S. agriculture is currently towards more advanced technology, greater fossil fuel dependency, and less sustainability. The ability of small farmers and urban gardens to turn a profit is effectively drowned out by the overproduction of agribusiness.

Cuba is already modeled

Ergas, 13 – graduate student in sociology at the University of Oregon (Christina, Monthly Review, March, “Cuban Urban Agriculture as a Strategy for Food Sovereignty” <http://monthlyreview.org/2013/03/01/cuban-urban-agriculture-as-a-strategy-for-food-sovereignty>

The agricultural revolution in Cuba has ignited the imaginations of people all over the world. Cuba’s model serves as a foundation for self-sufficiency, resistance to neocolonialist development projects, innovations in agroecology, alternatives to monoculture, and a more environmentally sustainable society. Instead of turning towards austerity measures and making concessions to large international powers during a severe economic downturn, Cubans reorganized food production and worked to gain food sovereignty as a means of subsistence, environmental protection, and national security.1 While these efforts may have been born of economic necessity, they are impressive as they have been developed in opposition to a corporate global food regime.¶ In Sustainable Urban Agriculture in Cuba, Sinan Koont indicates that most of the global South has lost any semblance of food sovereignty—the ability to be self-sufficient, to practice a more sustainable form of agriculture, and to direct farming toward meeting the needs of people within a country, rather than producing cash crops for export (187). The World Bank and International Monetary Fund imposed structural adjustment programs and free trade agreements on the so-called third world. These policies increased the influence of multinational corporations, such as Monsanto and Cargill, in global food production. They also encouraged large-scale monocultures, whereby food production is specialized by region for international trade. These policies threatened the national food security of countries in several interrelated ways.2¶ First, economically vulnerable countries are subject to the vagaries of the international marketplace, fluctuating food prices, and heavily subsidized produce from the global North that undermine the ability of the former to compete. Second, in a for-profit economic system, certain crops, like sugarcane, potato, and corn, are planted to produce biofuels, primarily ethanol, instead of food for poor populations. Rich nations that can afford to buy crops for biofuels inflate market prices for food, and when droughts or floods destroy whole harvests, then scarce food still goes to the highest bidder. Third, nations that specialize in cash crops for export must import food, increasing overall insecurity and dependency on trade networks. These nations are more vulnerable to changes in the costs of petroleum, as it influences expenses associated with transportation, fertilizers, pesticides, and the overall price of food. In countries with higher per capita incomes, increasing food costs are an annoyance for many people but not necessarily life threatening. In countries with high rates of poverty, price increases can be devastating. All of the above problems converged during the 2007–2008 food crisis that resulted in riots in Egypt, Haiti, Indonesia, Mexico, and Bangladesh, just to name a few.¶ People worldwide have been affected by these policies and have fought back. Some nations have taken to task corporations like Monsanto, as in the case of India’s response to genetically modified eggplant, which involved a boycott of Monsanto’s products and demands for the eradication of genetically modified foods.3 There are burgeoning local food movements, even in the United States, that despite numerous challenges attempt to produce food outside the current large-scale agricultural paradigm.4 There are also international movements that are working to change agricultural policies and practices. For example, La Vía Campesina is an international movement comprised of peasants, small-scale farmers, and their allies. Their primary goals are to stop neoliberal policies that promote oligopolistic corporate control over agriculture and to promote food sovereignty.

Environmental apocalypticism causes eco-authoritarianism and mass violence against those deemed environmental threats – also causes political apathy which turns case

Buell 3 (Frederick Buell, cultural critic on the environmental crisis and a Professor of English at Queens College and the author of five books; “From Apocalypse To Way of Life,” pg. 185-186)

Looked at critically, then, **crisis discourse** thus suffers from a number of liabilities. First, it seems to have become a **political liability** almost as much as an asset. It calls up a **fierce and effective opposition** with its predictions; worse, its more specific predictions are all too **vulnerable to refutation by events**. It also **exposes environmentalists to being called grim doomsters** and antilife Puritan extremists. Further, concern with crisis has all too often tempted people to try to find a “**total solution**” to the problems involved— a phrase that, as an astute analyst of the limitations of crisis discourse, John Barry, puts it, is all too reminiscent of the Third Reich’s infamous “**final solution**.”55 A total crisis of society—environmental crisis at its gravest—threatens to translate despair into **inhumanist authoritarianism**; more often, however, it helps keep merely dysfunctional authority in place. It thus leads, Barry suggests, to the belief that only elite- and expert-led solutions are possible.56 At the same timeit **depoliticizes people**, inducing them to accept their impotence as individuals; this is something that has made many people today feel, ironically and/or passively, that since it makes no difference at all what any individual does on his or her own, one might as well go along with it. Yet another pitfall for the full and sustained elaboration of environmental crisis is, though least discussed, perhaps the most deeply ironic. A problem with deep cultural and psychological as well as social effects, it is embodied in a startlingly simple proposition: the worse one feels environmental crisis is, the more one is tempted to turn one’s back on the environment. This means, preeminently, turning one’s back on “nature”—on traditions of nature feeling, traditions of knowledge about nature (ones that range from organic farming techniques to the different departments of ecological science), and traditions of nature-based activism. If nature is thoroughly wrecked these days, **people need to delink from nature** and live in postnature—a conclusion that, as the next chapter shows, many in U.S. society drew at the end of the millenium. Explorations of how deeply “nature” has been wounded and how intensely vulnerable to and dependent on human actions it is can thus lead, ironically, to **further indifference** to nature-based environmental issues, not greater concern with them. But what quickly becomes evident to any reflective consideration of the difficulties of crisis discourse is that all of these liabilities are in fact bound tightly up with one specific notion of environmental crisis—with 1960s- and 1970s-style environmental apocalypticism. Excessive concern about them does not recognize that crisis discourse as a whole has significantly changed since the 1970s. They remain inducements to look away from serious reflection on environmental crisis only if one does not explore how environmental crisis has turned of late from apocalypse to dwelling place. The apocalyptic mode had a number of prominent features: it was preoccupied with running out and running into walls; with scarcity and with the imminent rupture of limits; with actions that promised and temporally predicted imminent total meltdown; and with (often, though not always) the need for immediate “**total solution**.” **Thus doomsterism was its reigning mode; eco-authoritarianism** was a grave temptation; and as crisis was elaborated to show more and more severe deformations of nature, temptation increased to refute it, or give up, or even cut off ties to clearly terminal “nature.”

**Environmental alarmism is unfounded and not a justification for taking action**

**Kaleita, 7** – PHD, Assistant Professor Agricultural and Biosystems Engineering (Amy, “Hysteria’s History”Environmental Alarmism in Context”, <http://www.pacificresearch.org/docLib/20070920_Hysteria_History.pdf>)

Apocalyptic stories about the irreparable, catastrophic damage that humans are doing to the natural environment have been around for a long time. These hysterics often have some basis in reality, but are blown up to illogical and ridiculous proportions. Part of the reason they’re so appealing is that they have the ring of plausibility along with the intrigue of a horror flick. In many cases, the alarmists identify a legitimate issue, take the possible consequences to an extreme, and advocate action on the basis of these extreme projections. In 1972, the editor of the journal *Nature* pointed out the problem with the typical alarmist approach: “[Alarmists’] most common error is to suppose that the worst will always happen.”82 But of course, if the worst always happened, the human race would have died out long ago. When alarmism has a basis in reality, the challenge becomes to take appropriate action based on that reality, not on the hysteria. The aftermath of *Silent Spring* offers examples of both sorts of policy reactions: a reasoned response to a legitimate problem and a knee-jerk response to the hysteria. On the positive side, *Silent Spring* brought an end to the general belief that all synthetic chemicals in use for purposes ranging from insect control to household cleaning were uniformly wonderful, and it ushered in an age of increased caution on their appropriate use. In the second chapter of her famous book, Carson wrote, “It is not my contention that chemical insecticides must never be used. I do contend that… we have allowed these chemicals to be used with little or no advance investigation of their effect on soil, water, wildlife, and man himself.” Indeed, Carson seemed to advocate reasoned response to rigorous scientific investigation, and in fact this did become the modern approach to environmental chemical licensure and monitoring. An hour-long CBS documentary on pesticides was aired during the height of the furor over *Silent Spring*. In the documentary, Dr. Page Nicholson, a water-pollution expert with the Public Health Service, wasn’t able to answer how long pesticides persist in water once they enter it, or the extent to which pesticides contaminate groundwater supplies. Today, this sort of information is gathered through routine testing of chemicals for use in the environment. 20 V: Lessons from the Apocalypse Ironically, rigorous investigation was not used in the decision to ban DDT, primarily due to the hysteria *Silent Spring* generated. In this example, the hysteria took on a life of its own, even trumping the author’s original intent. There was, as we have seen, a more sinister and tragic response to the hysteria generated by *Silent Spring*. Certain developing countries, under significant pressure from the United States, abandoned the use of DDT. This decision resulted in millions of deaths from malaria and other insect-borne diseases. In the absence of pressure to abandon the use of DDT, these lives would have been spared. It would certainly have been possible to design policies requiring caution and safe practices in the use of supplemental chemicals in the environment, without pronouncing a death sentence on millions of people. A major challenge in developing appropriate responses to legitimate problems is that alarmism catches people’s attention and draws them in. Alarmism is given more weight than it deserves, as policy makers attempt to appease their constituency and the media. It polarizes the debaters into groups of “believers” and “skeptics,” so that reasoned, fact-based compromise is difficult to achieve. Neither of these aspects of alarmism is healthy for the development of appropriate policy. Further, alarmist responses to valid problems risk foreclosing potentially useful responses based on ingenuity and progress. There are many examples from the energy sector where, in the presence of economic, efficiency, or societal demands, the marketplace has responded by developing better alternatives. That is not to say that we should blissfully squander our energy resources; on the contrary, we should be careful to utilize them wisely. But energy-resource hysteria should not lead us to circumvent scientific advancement by cherry-picking and favoring one particular replacement technology at the expense of other promising technologies. Environmental alarmism should be taken for what it is—a natural tendency of some portion of the public to latch onto the worst, and most unlikely, potential outcome. Alarmism should not be used as the basis for policy. Where a real problem exists, solutions should be based on reality, not hysteria.

**The status quo food crisis in directly linked to the logic of neoliberal–speculation and land grabbing proves**

Houtart 11 (Francois, Belgian Marxist Sociologist, serves as an advisor to CETRI (Centre Tricontinental) a Belgian non-governmental organization which he founded in 1976, was awarded the UNESCO-Madanjeet Singh Prize for the Promotion of Tolerance and Non-Violence, “ FROM ‘COMMON GOODS’ TO THE ‘COMMON GOOD OF HUMANITY,” ROSA LUXEMBURG FOUNDATION BRUSSELS, NOVEMBER)

There are two aspects to the food crisis. One is a conjunction of short-term factors, the other is due to (structural) long term factors. The former can be seen in the sudden rise of food prices in 2007 and 2008. It is true that this can be attributed to several causes, such as dwindling reserves, but the main reason was speculative, with the production of agrofuels being partly responsible (maize-based ethanol in the United States). Thus over a period of two years, the price of wheat on the Chicago stock exchange rose by 100 per cent, maize by 98 per cent and ethanol by 80 per cent. During these years appreciable amounts of speculative capital moved from other sectors into investing in food production in the expectation of rapid and significant profits. As a consequence, according to the FAO director general, in each of the years 2008 and 2009 more than 50 million people fell below the poverty line, and the total number of those living in poverty rose to the unprecedented level of over one billion people. This was clearly the result of the logic of profits, the capitalist law of value. The second aspect is structural. Over the last few years there has been an expansion of monoculture, resulting in the concentration of land-holdings – in other words, a veritable reversal of land reform. Peasant and family agriculture is being destroyed all over the world on the pretext of its low productivity. It is true that monoculture can produce from 500 and even 1,000 times more than peasant agriculture in its present state. Nevertheless, two factors should be taken into account: first, this kind of production is leading to ecological destruction. It eliminates forests, and contaminates the soil and the waters of oceans and rivers through the massive use of chemical products. Over the next 50 to 75 years we shall be creating the deserts of tomorrow. Second, peasants are being thrown off their lands, and millions of them have to migrate to the cities, to live in shanty towns, exacerbating the tasks of women and causing urban crises, as well as increasing internal migratory pressure, as in Brazil; or they are going to other countries (Mexico, Central America, Colombia, Ecuador, Philippines, Sri Lanka, India, Pakistan, Afghanistan, Morocco, Algeria, West Africa).Together with public services, agriculture is now one of the new frontiers for capital (Samir Amin, 2004), especially in times when the profitability of productive industrial capital is relatively reduced and there is a considerable expansion of financial capital seeking new sources of profit. Recently we have witnessed an unprecedented phenomenon: the land grabbing by private and State capital, particularly in Africa, for the production of food and agrofuels. The South Korean corporation Daewoo obtained a concession of 1,200,000 hectares in Madagascar for a period of 99 years, which provoked a serious political crisis in that country and finally a revision of the contract. Countries like Libya and the Gulf Emirates are doing likewise in Mali and various other African countries. European and North American mining and agro-energy multinationals are securing the opportunity to exploit tens of millions of hectares for long periods, as Chinese State and private enterprises are also doing. There is very little concern in these initiatives for the ecological and social implications, which are considered as ‘externalities’, i.e. external to market calculations. And this is precisely the second aspect of capitalist logic, after the growth of the rate of profitability. It is not capital that is having to deal with the negative effects, but local societies and individuals. This has always been the strategy of capital, even in the countries of the centre, with no concern for the fate of the working classes, or for the peoples in the peripheries under colonialism. There is no concern, either, for nature and the way of life of local populations. It is for all these reasons that the food crisis, in both its conjunctural and structural aspects, is directly linked to the logic of capitalism.

Empirics prove there’s no link between food shortages and war – correlation not causation

Scheschkewitz 11 (Daniel, correspondent for Deutsche Welle in Washington, D.C., “Food wars: hunger as a threat to global security,” 11/14, <http://www.dw.de/food-wars-hunger-as-a-threat-to-global-security/a-15444860>, LVS)

It can be very difficult to scientifically prove a direct correlation between conflict and a lack of resources. Theoretically, any additional competition for resources in politically fragile countries and regions can lead to violent conflict. But in most cases, hunger or food shortages are only one of many factors, said Steffen Angenendt, co-author of a study by the German Institute for International and Security Affairs on the conflict potential of natural resource shortages. Unequal distribution or bad government leadership has to pile up in order to create security problems.¶ The most recent hunger crisis in the Horn of Africa threatens security there¶ At that point, protests against high food prices can lead to antagonism toward the regime in power. That is how the street demonstrations against the regime of Tunisian dictator Zine El Abidine Ben Ali began, as protests against high bread prices, before they turned against the system as a whole.¶ "The bread riots in the Arab Spring were more symbolic," said Joachim von Braun, the development researcher. "They were the catalyst for demonstrations in a complex political conflict, and thus only one of many reasons for unhappiness."¶ Acute food price demonstrations take place in countries with noticeably lower incomes than Tunisia. There they play an increasingly important role, as in Ethiopia, where the constitution states that the land belongs to the state.

### Legitimacy

The affirmative’s hegemony impact is reminiscent of the Algonquian monster, the Wendigo – insatiable and bloodthirsty, its only purpose is endless destruction as it struggles to maintain itself – in a similar way, hegemony is a constant process of enemy-creation – a paranoid politics towards the impossible telos of world domination – this politics is responsible both for every atrocity in the 20th century as well as the exacerbation of every modern geopolitical crisis

Cunningham 13 (Finian Cunningham, expert in international affairs specializing in the Middle East, former journalist expelled from Bahrain due to his revealing of human rights violations committed by the Western-backed regime, basically a badass, 3-11-13, “US Creates Nuclear Armed Cyber-attack Retaliation Force. Psychotic Superpower on a Hair Trigger,” <http://nsnbc.me/2013/03/11/us-creates-nuclear-armed-cyberattack-retaliation-force-psychotic-superpower-on-a-hair-trigger/>) gz

Since at least World War II, the genocidal propensity and practices of the US are proven, if not widely known, especially among its propagandized public. The atomic holocaust of hundreds of thousands of civilians at Hiroshima and Nagasaki marked the beginning of the long shadow cast upon the world by this deranged superpower. For a few decades, the crazed American giant could hide behind the veil of the «Cold War» against the Soviet Union, pretending to be the protector of the «free world». If that was true, then why since the Cold War ended more than 20 years ago has there not been peace on earth? Why have conflicts proliferated to the point that there is now a permanent state of war in the world? Former Yugoslavia, Iraq, Afghanistan have melded into countless other US-led wars across Asia, the Middle East and Africa. The «War on Terror» and its tacit invocation of «evil Islamists» have sought to replace the «Cold War» and its bogeymen, the «evil communists». But if we set aside these narratives, then the alternative makes compelling sense and accurate explanation of events. That alternative is simply this: that the US is an imperialist warmonger whose appetite for war, plunder and hegemony is insatiable. If the US had no official enemy, it would have to invent one. The Cold War narrative can be disabused easily by the simple contradictory fact, as already mentioned, that more than 22 years after the collapse of the «evil» Soviet Union the world is no less peaceful and perhaps even more racked by belligerence and conflict. The War on Terror narrative can likewise be dismissed by the fact that the «evil Islamists» supposedly being combated were created by US and British military intelligence along with Saudi money in Afghanistan during the 1980s and are currently being supported by the West to destabilize Libya and Syria and indirectly Mali. So what we are left to deduce is a world that is continually being set at war by the US and its various surrogates. As the executive power in the global capitalist system, the US is the main protagonist in pursuing the objectives of the financial-military-industrial complex. These objectives include: subjugation of all nations – their workers, governments and industries, for the total economic and political domination by the global network of finance capitalism. In this function, of course, the US government is aided by its Western allies and the NATO military apparatus. Any nation not completely toeing the imperialist line will be targeted for attack. They include Russia, China, Iran, Venezuela, Cuba and North Korea. In the past, they included Vietnam, Angola, Mozambique, Grenada, Nicaragua, Chile and Panama. Presently, others include Iraq, Afghanistan, Libya, Syria and Mali undergoing attack operations. The difference between covert and overt attack by the US hegemon is only a matter of degrees. The decades-long economic sanctions on Iran, the cyber sabotage of that country’s industries and infrastructure, the assassination of nuclear scientists, deployment of terrorist proxies such as the MEK, and the repeated threat of all-out war by the US and its Israeli surrogate, could all qualify Iran as already being subjected to war and not just a future target. Likewise with Russia: the expansion of US missile systems around Russia’s borders is an act of incremental war. Likewise China: the American arming of Taiwan, relentless war gaming in the South China Sea and the stoking of territorial conflicts are all examples of where «politics is but war by other means». What history shows us is that the modern world has been turned into a lawless shooting gallery under the unhinged misrule of the United States of America. That has always been so since at least the Second World War, with more than 60 wars having been waged by Washington during that period, and countless millions killed. For decades this truth has been obscured by propaganda – the Cold War, War on Terror etc – but now the appalling stark reality is unavoidably clear. The US is at war – against the entire world.

This politics is maintained by a farce of legitimacy which justifies endless destruction

Gulli 13**.** Bruno Gulli, professor of history, philosophy, and political science at Kingsborough College in New York, “For the critique of sovereignty and violence,” <http://academia.edu/2527260/For_the_Critique_of_Sovereignty_and_Violence>, pg. 5

I think that we have now an understanding of what the situation is: **The sovereign everywhere**, be it the political or financial elite, **fakes the legitimacy** on which its power and authority supposedly rest. In truth, they **rest on violence and terror**, or the threat thereof. This is an **obvious and essential aspect** of the singularity of the present crisis. In this sense, the singularity of the crisis lies in the fact that the struggle for dominance is at one and the same time impaired and made more brutal by **the lack of hegemony**. This is true in general, but it is perhaps particularly true with respect to the greatest power on earth, **the United States**, whose hegemony has **diminished or vanished**. It is a fortiori true of whatever is called ‘the West,’ of which the US has for about a century represented the vanguard. Lacking hegemony, the **sheer drive for domination** has to show **its true face**, its **raw violence**. The usual, traditional **ideological justifications for dominance** (such as bringing democracy and freedom here and there) have now become **very weak** because of **the contempt** that the dominant nations (the US and its most powerful allies) **regularly show** toward legality, morality, and humanity. Of course, the so-called rogue states, thriving on corruption, do not fare any better in this sense, but for them, when they act autonomously and against the dictates of ‘the West,’ the specter of punishment, in the form of retaliatory war or even indictment from the International Criminal Court, remains a clear limit, a possibility. **Not so for the dominant nations**: who will stop the United States from striking anywhere at will, or Israel from regularly massacring people in the Gaza Strip, or envious France from once again trying its luck in Africa? Yet, though still dominant, these nations are painfully aware of their **structural, ontological and historical, weakness**. All attempts at concealing that weakness (and the uncomfortable awareness of it) **only heighten the brutality** in the exertion of **what remains of their dominance**. Although they rely on a **highly sophisticated military machine** (the technology of drones is a clear instance of this) and on an equally sophisticated diplomacy, which has **traditionally** been and **increasingly** is an outpost for **military operations and global policing** (now excellently **incarnated by Africom**), **they know that they have lost their hegemony**.

**No impact to hegemony**

**Fettweis, 11**

Christopher J. Fettweis, Department of Political Science, Tulane University, 9/26/11, Free Riding or Restraint? Examining European Grand Strategy, Comparative Strategy, 30:316–332, EBSCO

It is perhaps worth noting that there is no evidence to support a direct relationship between the relative level of U.S. activism and international stability. In fact, the limited data we do have suggest the opposite may be true. During the 1990s, the United States cut back on its defense spending fairly substantially. By 1998, the United States was spending $100 billion less on defense in real terms than it had in 1990.51 To internationalists, defense hawks and believers in hegemonic stability, this irresponsible “peace dividend” endangered both national and global security. “No serious analyst of American military capabilities,” argued Kristol and Kagan, “doubts that the defense budget has been cut much too far to meet America’s responsibilities to itself and to world peace.”52 On the other hand, if the pacific trends were not based upon U.S. hegemony but a strengthening norm against interstate war, one would not have expected an increase in global instability and violence. The verdict from the past two decades is fairly plain: The world grew more peaceful while the United States cut its forces. No state seemed to believe that its security was endangered by a less-capable United States military, or at least none took any action that would suggest such a belief. No militaries were enhanced to address power vacuums, no security dilemmas drove insecurity or arms races, and no regional balancing occurred once the stabilizing presence of the U.S. military was diminished. The rest of the world acted as if the threat of international war was not a pressing concern, despite the reduction in U.S. capabilities. Most of all, the United States and its allies were no less safe. The incidence and magnitude of global conflict declined while the United States cut its military spending under President Clinton, and kept declining as the Bush Administration ramped the spending back up. No complex statistical analysis should be necessary to reach the conclusion that the two are unrelated. Military spending figures by themselves are insufficient to disprove a connection between overall U.S. actions and international stability. Once again, one could presumably argue that spending is not the only or even the best indication of hegemony, and that it is instead U.S. foreign political and security commitments that maintain stability. Since neither was significantly altered during this period, instability should not have been expected. Alternately, advocates of hegemonic stability could believe that relative rather than absolute spending is decisive in bringing peace. Although the United States cut back on its spending during the 1990s, its relative advantage never wavered. However, even if it is true that either U.S. commitments or relative spending account for global pacific trends, then at the very least stability can evidently be maintained at drastically lower levels of both. In other words, even if one can be allowed to argue in the alternative for a moment and suppose that there is in fact a level of engagement below which the United States cannot drop without increasing international disorder, a rational grand strategist would still recommend cutting back on engagement and spending until that level is determined. Grand strategic decisions are never final; continual adjustments can and must be made as time goes on. Basic logic suggests that the United States ought to spend the minimum amount of its blood and treasure while seeking the maximum return on its investment. And if the current era of stability is as stable as many believe it to be, no increase in conflict would ever occur irrespective of U.S. spending, which would save untold trillions for an increasingly debt-ridden nation. It is also perhaps worth noting that if opposite trends had unfolded, if other states had reacted to news of cuts in U.S. defense spending with more aggressive or insecure behavior, then internationalists would surely argue that their expectations had been fulfilled. If increases in conflict would have been interpreted as proof of the wisdom of internationalist strategies, then logical consistency demands that the lack thereof should at least pose a problem. As it stands, the only evidence we have regarding the likely systemic reaction to a more restrained United States suggests that the current peaceful trends are unrelated to U.S. military spending. Evidently the rest of the world can operate quite effectively without the presence of a global policeman. Those who think otherwise base their view on faith alone.

Cooperation will not be value neutral – American foreign policy is overdetermined by the logic of liberal integration which will view the plan as a concession and expect compliance with whatever our next foreign policy goal is – if the countries they cooperate with don’t follow US command they will suffer the consequences

Campbell, 7 - International Boundaries Research Unit, Geography Department, Durham University (David, “Performing security: The imaginative geographies of current US strategy” 2007)

It is important to highlight the way performativity’s idea of reiteration calls attention to changes in historically established imaginative geographies. While US foreign policy has been traditionally written in the context of identity/difference expressed in self/other relationships (Campbell, 1992), we detect in recent strategic performances a different articulation of America’s relationship to the world. Signiﬁed by the notion of **integration** we identify elements in the formation of a new imaginative geography which enable the US to **draw countries into its** spheres of inﬂuence and control. We show how integration (and its coeval strategies of exclusion) has been **enunciated** over the last 15 years through popular-**academic books, think-tank documents, policy programmes and security strategies**, as well as popular geopolitical sources. This concept of integration, we argue, is enacted through a number of practices of **representation and coercion** that encourage countries to adopt a raft of US attitudes and ways of operating or else **suffer the consequences**. As such, we are witnessing the performance of a security problematic that requires critical perspectives to move beyond a simple ideal/material dichotomy in social analysis in order to account for more complex understandings of opposition, including the emergence of new, mobile geographies of exclusion.

No impact to legitimacy – one issue won’t spill over

MacDonald and Parent 11—Former Research Fellow, International Security Program [Spring 2011, Paul K. MacDonald and Joseph M. Parent, Belfer Center at Harvard, “Graceful Decline? The Surprising Success of Great Power Retrenchment” *International Security*, volume 35, issue 4, pages 7-44, http://belfercenter.ksg.harvard.edu/files/ISEC\_a\_00034-MacDonald\_proof2.pdf]

These arguments have a number of limitations. First, opponents of retrenchment exaggerate the importance of credibility in the defense of commitments. Just because a state has signaled a willingness to retreat from one commitment does not mean it will retreat from others. Studies of reputation, for example, have demonstrated a tenuous link between past behavior and current reputation. 22 The capacity to defend a commitment is as important as credibility in determining the strength of a commitment. Quantitative studies have likewise found a mixed link between previous concessions and deterrence failure. 23 The balance of power between the challenger and the defender, in contrast, is often decisive. For instance, after a series of crises over Berlin and Cuba, British Prime Minister Harold Macmillan observed to his cabinet, "The fact that the Soviet Government had agreed to withdraw their missiles and their aircraft from Cuba was not evidence of weakness but of realism. . . . But Berlin was an entirely different question; not only was it of vital importance to the Soviet Government but the Russians had overwhelming conventional superiority in the area." 24 This finding supports the basic insight of retrenchment: by concentrating scarce resources, a policy of retrenchment exchanges a diffuse reputation for toughness for a concentrated capability at key points of challenge. Second, pessimists overstate the extent to which a policy of retrenchment can damage a great power's capabilities or prestige. Gilpin, in particular, assumes that a great power's commitments are on equal footing and interdependent. In practice, however, great powers make commitments of varying degrees that are functionally independent of one another. Concession in one area need not be seen as influencing a commitment in another area. 25 Far from being perceived as interdependent, great power commitments are often seen as being rivalrous, so that abandoning commitments in one area may actually bolster the strength of a commitment in another area. During the Korean War, for instance, President Harry Truman's administration explicitly backed away from total victory on the peninsula to strengthen deterrence in Europe. 26 Retreat in an area of lesser importance freed up resources and signaled a strong commitment to an area of greater significance.

Liberal commercial peace is a mask for a cult of patriarchal violence

Neocleous 11 (Mark Neocleous, professor of the critique of the political economy (yes that is a thing) at Brunel University, PhD in philosophy, November 2011, “’O Effeminacy! Effeminacy!’ War, Masculinity and the Myth of Liberal Peace,” *European Journal of International Relations* Volume 19 Issue 1, GENDER MODIFIED OR IN CONTEXT) gz

‘O Effeminacy! Effeminacy! Who wou’d imagine this could be the Vice of such as appear no inconsiderable Men?’ (Shaftesbury, 2001 [1732], III: 113). Such was the concern of Shaftesbury in 1732. I have been arguing that this concern permeated the political discourse of 18th-century liberalism. The reason the thinkers in question thought effeminacy a vice is because they believed that, along with associated vices such as luxury, it undermined the martial spirit. As I have shown, the extent of this concern was huge. I suggest that this is also politically telling, in a number of ways.¶ First, because it reveals the belief in the necessity for strong martial spirit and sustained military values among the thinkers in question. Indeed, the liberals in question were not merely sensitive to the tradition of thought which emphasized the creative role of war in the development of civilization and the shaping of the character of human beings, but actually believed in and perpetuated this tradition. Far from perpetual peace, what was at stake in the liberal thinking of the time was a concern with how to maintain commercial order as a realm of liberty such that the virtues of civil society did not threaten the virtues of martial power. Within this, the question of how to stop the effeminacy and luxury of civilization from overawing the masculinity of military virtue and undermining the martial nature of masculine power was paramount. One might note here that this argument reinforces the feminist claim regarding classical liberalism’s patriarchal nature, pointing as it does to the unity of the masculinity required for war and the masculinity required for citizenship (Elshtain, 1987; Lloyd, 1986: 63–76). My point is that this somewhat undermines one of the historical claims made within the liberal peace thesis, namely that the conceptual underpinning of the liberal peace lies in part in the 18th-century Scottish Enlightenment’s conception of commercial ~~man~~ [person] and civil society.¶ My second suggestion is that any reasonable exercise in the history of 18th-century political thought would have shown IR theorists the need to disentangle the association of economic liberalism and peace. The association itself is a product of a link first made by the more doctrinaire ‘free traders’ of the 19th century peddling the myth of a link between peace and trade (Earle, 1990: 222, 226; Howe, 2007; Winch, 1978: 104). From there, the idea of a liberal vision of peace rooted in an image of economic order very easily became a piece of received wisdom. Too many IR theorists have accepted this received wisdom uncritically and perpetuated it unthinkingly, systematically ignoring the importance which the 18th-century liberals attached to military valour and martial virtues and which suggests that the belief that key thinkers of the liberal Enlightenment valued peace above all else is a piece of political mythology of the highest order. Some years ago David Spiro (1994) challenged some of the empirical data of the liberal peace thesis and provocatively called his paper ‘The insignificance of the liberal peace’. The problem, I suggest, is not the insignificance of the thesis but its status as a modern political myth.¶ As such, my third suggestion is that as well as debunking such myths and challenging the received wisdom of IR, a critical engagement in the history of ideas supports recent attempts to radically rethink the liberal tradition. I have elsewhere argued that liberalism’s key concept is less liberty and more security. Nowhere is this clearer than in 18th-century liberal thought, which subsumed liberty under the idea of security (Neocleous, 2000, 2008). But as Michael Shapiro (1993: 15) notes, ‘security’ in the work of Smith (and, we might add, other classical liberals) is never a reference to mere ‘defence’, but also connotes an active and militaristic practice. Liberalism as a political ideology has been committed to this active militaristic practice since its inception, which is one of the reasons why liberal states as organized political powers have turned out to be so fundamentally violent.**¶** The implications of this argument therefore go beyond merely pointing out the poor engagement with the history of political thought on the part of too many IR scholars.¶ Rather, the argument lends support to a growing body of work arguing that liberalism needs to be considered less as a doctrine inherently committed to peace and much more through the ‘ferocious violence with which it deploys techniques to penetrate and organise the dispositions of liberal subjects themselves’ (Reid, 2004: 64). In the history of ideas there has been a revival of interest in what Pocock (1975) calls the Machiavellian moment, a key aspect of which is the cultivation of military virtue as part of one’s civic duty. There is a decidedly liberal version of this through the centuries. ‘There is a kind of violence within liberalism’, notes Richard Tuck, ‘in which liberty and warfare (both civil and international conflict) were bound together’ (1999: 195). A fair amount of recent work from a range of positions and with a variety of foci lends weight to this argument, and really points us towards the idea that liberalism needs to be seen less through the lens of peace and more through the lens of war (Barkawi and Laffey, 2001; Dillon and Reid, 2009; Kochi, 2009; Losurdo, 2011; Meyer, 2008; Neocleous, 2010, 2011; Seymour, 2008; Spieker, 2011; Thorup, 2006). Far from being insignificant, the liberal peace thesis plays a crucial ideological role in masking classical liberalism’s understanding of war as the exercise of the liberal spirit.

## 2NC

### Heg/Legitimacy

**Even if they win hegemony is real, the universalization of hegemonic ontology makes violence through backlash the only possible response – they’re in a double bind**

**Mouffe 7** Chantal Mouffe, Professor of Political Theory at the Centre for the Study of Democracy, University of Westminster, 2007, “Carl Schmitt’s warning on the dangers of a unipolar world,” in The International Political Thought of Carl Schmitt, Edited by: Odysseos and Petito, p. 152

I submit that it is high time to acknowledge the pluralist character of the world and to relinquish the Eurocentric tenet that modernization can only take place through Westernization. We should relinquish the illusion that antagonisms could be eliminated through unification of the world, achieved by transcending the political, conflict and negativity. It is also necessary to abandon the idea that the aim of politics is to establish consensus on one single model. The central problem that our current unipolar world is facing is that it is impossible for antagonisms to find legitimate forms of expression. It is no wonder, then, that those antagonisms, when they emerge, take extreme forms, putting into question the very structure of the existing international order. It is, in my view, the lack of political channels for challenging the hegemony of the neo-liberal model of globalization which is at the origin of the proliferation of discourses and practices of radical negation of the established order. In order to create channels for the legitimate expression of dissent we need to envisage a pluralistic world order constructed around a certain number of great spaces and genuine cultural poles.¶ The new forms of terrorism reveal the dangers implicit in the delusions of the universalist globalist discourse which postulates that human progress requires the establishment of world unity based on the adoption of the Western model. This is why, against the illusions of the universalist-humanitarians, it is urgent to listen to Schmitt when he reminds us that ‘[t]he political world is a pluriverse, not a universe’ (Schmitt 1976: 53). This is, I believe, the only way to avoid the ‘clash of civilizations’ announced by Huntington (1996) and to which, despite its intentions, the universalist discourse is, in fact, contributing.

**Hegemonic benignity is a project of paranoid vassalage**

SAMIR **AMIN** director of the African office (in Dakar, Senegal) of the Third World Forum, an international nongovernmental association for research and debate, and chair of the World Forum for Alternatives. He is the author of numerous books and articles including Beyond U.S. Hegemony 25 FEB **2003** (“The Alternative to the neoliberal system of globalization and militarism Imperialism Today and the Hegemonic Offensive of the United States.”)

28. The hegemonic strategy of the United States is articulated on the collective character of new imperialism and to the profit of the insufficiencies and weaknesses of the “antineoliberal” social and political movements. 29. This strategy, barely recognized by the “proAmerican” defenders, is, in the dominant discourse, the object of two “soft” propositions, not quite real, but operational, from the point of view of our opponent. The first is that this hegemony belongs to a “gentle” leadership, sometimes knows as “benign hegemony” by the democratic fraction of the American establishment. Through this mix of false naivety and real hypocrisy, this discourse pretends that the United States only acts in the interests of the peoples who are associated with the triad, motivated by the same “democratic” pulses, and even the interests of the rest of the world, to whom globalization offers the chance of “development”, reinforced by the benefits of democracy that American powers promote everywhere, as we know. The second is that, in all domains, the Unites States benefit from enormous advantages  whether it be economic, scientific, political, military or cultural that legitimize their hegemony. In fact, American hegemony works from logic, and a system, that has little to do with the discourse it envelops. 30. The objectives of this hegemony have been proclaimed, and adhered to in innumerable productions from the US leaders (unfortunately, little read by its victims). After the fall of the USSR  their only potential military adversary  the US establishment evaluates that it has a period of about 20 years to put into place its global hegemony and reduce to nothingness the possibilities of its potential “rivals”, not that they are necessarily capable of an alternative hegemony, just capable of affirming their autonomy in a global system that would be “nonhegemonic”  in my language, a multicentric system. These “rivals” are of course Europe (we no longer hear talks about a Japan hegemony !), but also Russia and most of all China, the principal designated adversary that Washington may have to envision destroying (militarily) if she continues to persist in her “development” and a certain independent will. Other rivals have also been noted, in fact, all Southern countries that may develop a resistance to the exigencies of globalized neoliberalism  India or Brazil, Iran or South Africa. 31. The objectives are therefore to vassalize the allies in the triad, to make them incapable of effective global initiatives, and to destroy the “large countries”, always by nature too “big” (the United States being the only one with right to be so). Dismantle Russia after the USSR, dismantle China, India, even Brazil; instrumentalising the weaknesses of each country’s power systems, manipulate the former States of the USSR, and stroke the centrifugal forces in the Russian Federation, support the Muslims of Xinjiang and the Tibetan monks, feeding the conflict with the Muslims of the Indian subcontinent, intervening in the Amazon (Plan Colombia), etc.

**It fosters nationalism that justifies destruction of everything non-American**

**Porotsky 13** (Sophia Porotsky, MA honors candidate in international relations at the University of St Andrews, April 26th, 2013, “Pax Americana: The Successful Securitization of the Triple Threat of Terrorism, “Outlaw” Regimes, and Weapons of Mass Destruction,” http://www.academia.edu/3482477/Pax\_Americana\_The\_Successful\_Securitization\_of\_the\_Triple\_Threat\_of\_Terrorism\_Outlaw\_Regimes\_and\_Weapons\_of\_Mass\_Destruction) gz

In Legitimizing the “War on Terror”: Political Myth in Official-Level Rhetoric, Joanne Esch contends that mythical discourse imbues language with power (Esch, 2010: 357). This follows the argument put forth by the previous authors mentioned, and stresses that threats are discursively constructed and intended to manufacture public consent for government policies. Esch defines political myth in terms of “Bottici’s (2007) philosophical understanding of political myth as a process of work on a common narrative that answers the human need to ground events in significance” (Esch, 2010: 357). This is in direct correlation to the tenets of securitzation theory, as it adds depth to an understanding of the various devices used in the rhetorical representation of threats. As Esch elaborates, “three key attributes distinguish a political myth from a simple narrative: First a mythical narrative provides significance. Second it is shared by a group and (re)produced at various levels. Third, it can come to affect the political conditions of the group” (Esch, 2010: 362). The deployment of mythical discourse in political rhetoric is instrumental to identifying the mechanisms influencing public opinion, and informs my discourse analysis by outlining two prominent political myths in American political discourse: American Exceptionalism and Civilization vs. Barbarism. These myths are particularly powerful “because they have been tools of moral justification for military violence since the Declaration of Independence” (Esch, 2010: 365). The political myth of American Exceptionalism “consists of three ideas: America is a ‘chosen nation,’ America has a ‘calling’ or ‘mission,’ and in answering that calling, America represents the forces of good against evil” (Esch, 2010: 366). These ideas are embedded throughout the government texts, and are powerful indicators of moral justifications derived from the myth of American Exceptionalism. The myth of Civilization vs. Barbarism “relates to national identity and tells of the good nature and character of Americans vis à vis the ‘evil Other’…This myth is a classic story of ‘Us versus Them’ that favors cultural or civilizational explanations for conflict over political or economic ones” (Esch, 2010: 370). It becomes apparent how this myth can be utilized to obscure enemy grievances, while simultaneously dehumanizing them by denying them qualities of ‘civilized’ people. Esch accentuates the power of these myths, precisely because they are often invisible yet ubiquitous (Esch, 2010: 357). During my discourse analysis of Bush texts, I found that nearly every third sentence contained language linked to one of these political myths. Esch argues that these political myths were staples in the “War on Terror” discourse, and that political elites have “rhetorically accessed these mythical representations of the world in ways that legitimize and normalize the practices of the ‘War on Terror’” (Esch, 2010: 357). Esch provides an important piece of the puzzle in answering the question of how the administration was able to use the threats it constructed to justify its actions: actions which amounted to a preventive war, unprecedented executive power, and very questionable human rights practices.

**AT: Obama better**

**Learn how to read**

**Lifton 11** (Robert Jay Lifton, not an aff author, 2011, “Witness to an Extreme Century: A Memoir,” pp 405-7) gz

With all of the American angst during the first year or so of the Obama administration, one may readily forget the power of the historical moment of his election in 2008. BJ and I had a few friends in to watch the returns on the sleek television set in our living room, which we had purchased four years earlier for a similar gathering that had resulted in a roomful of despair and suspicion of fraud in relation to the Bush victory. But this time, in 2008, the television set did not betray us, and my reaction of not just joy but ecstasy, including tears, was hardly mine alone. What was special to me, though, was the quick realization that the outcome meant an end to the country's superpower syndrome. But was that the case? Only partly, it turns out. Certainly Obama and his administration have renounced the principle of American omnipotence in favor of more modest claims about our capacities and influence in the world. Apocalypticism and totalistic behavior have given way to something closer to Camus's "philosophy of limits" with an acceptance of ambiguity, nuance, and complexity. And most important, there has been a specific rejection of nuclearism and a call for abolition of the weapons.¶ Yet despite all that, **the syndrome lingers** in crucial areas that specifically connect with my work. Concerning nuclear abolition, Obama has not followed through with clear American policies, despite an impressive convocation of world leaders on the subject of nuclear danger. On revelations of torture, and more recently of illegitimate medical experiments in relation to torture, Obama has mostly tried to sidestep the issue and avoid legal culpability of those involved. Finally, his decision to send added troops to Afghanistan seems to me to be the stuff of war-making, and atrocity-producing, blunder. In all three cases there is a certain clinging to the very American omnipotence being renounced. I have found myself torn between joining a considerable segment of the left in a condemnation of shortcomings that perpetuate elements of the superpower syndrome, and an alternative inclination to defend Obama as an incremental reformer who needs more time.¶ I took the latter position in a series of discussions with Howard Zinn, who denounced Obama as "a Chicago politician" and a hypocrite. I still don't agree with that judgment but I am also willing to take a public stand of strong opposition to Obama policies on Afghanistan and on American torture and recently revealed experimentation. Yet I remain sensitive as well to the importance of supporting the Obama administration in the face of new waves of right-wing American totalism and potential violence in the backlash over the election of our first African-American president.¶ I have a feeling that if one lives long enough one can be witness to just about every variation of American domestic and foreign policy, good and bad. What I can best do, I believe, is to **sustain a critique** of **residual features** of the superpower syndrome, always connected with work I have done in areas that have contributed to that syndrome.

**their argument feeds into the systems of domination endemic to Obama’s presidency – vote neg to reject their masking of mass imperialism**

**Comissiong 13** (Solomon Comissiong, educator, activist, public speaker, founder of the Your World News community media collective, member of the Black Agenda Report, 5-11-13, “The More Effective Evil: The Impact of Barack Obama’s Presidency on the Black Community,” transcribed from video, 0:20-2:40, <http://www.youtube.com/watch?feature=player_embedded&v=i-LAJSlO3GU>) gz

Since becoming the US’s first black president in 2008, Barack Obama has proven to be a proverbial God-sent for Wall Street bankers, the military industrial complex, and US imperialism. His domestic policies have been an affront to the so-called middle class, the working poor, and people of color. His race to the top educational scheme is essentially George Bush’s No Child Left Behind on steroids; firing teachers and shutting down schools in black and Latino communities, all the while, making room for corporate control charter schools. Barack Obama has not offered a single targeted plan to mitigate the enormous gap between blacks and whites caused by American-style institutional racism. Obama won’t even utter the words “institutional” “racism” side by side. President Obama’s impact has been devastating on the overall conscience of a great many African Americans. Historically, African Americans have been amongst the most progress demographics in the US, however, since Obama’s political ascension, that history is becoming more and more distant.¶ Obama has popularized America’s imperialist wars throughout the African American community. These wars have historically been protested and resisted by African Americans; however, that is ostensibly no longer the case. As recently as the mid-2000s, African Americans were openly protesting the Bush administration’s imperialist wars and crimes against humanity. Since becoming president, Barack Obama has expanded the theatre of war in Afghanistan, Yemen, and Somalia. He then bombed Libya into oblivion while financing terrorist rebels that committed heinous atrocities, especially on anyone who is black and a supporter of Muammar Gaddafi. Obama predicated the bombing of Libya on a blatant array of outright lies and, as usual, the American people consumed this trough of lies fed to them by the corporate media and the White House. Unfortunately, most African Americans have either kept silent in the face of Obama’s warmongering and crimes against humanity or they have outright supported it while making excuses for the war criminal, Obama. The combination of Obama being brown and a Democrat made him the white establishment’s perfect weapon to pacify the black community.

**2NC fails**

**hegemonic stability theory is nonsensical**

**Mack 10** (Andrew Mack, literally the person that they cite in their card, the guy who doesn’t like heg, “The Causes of Peace”) gz

As with other realist claims, there are reasons for **skepticism**¶ about the peace through preponderance thesis. First, if it were¶ true, we might expect that the most powerful states would¶ experience the least warfare. However, since the end of World¶ War II, **the opposite** has in fact been the case. Between 1946¶ and 2008, the four countries that had been involved in the¶ greatest number of international conflicts were France, the¶ UK, the US, and Russia/USSR.19 Yet, these were four of the¶ most powerful conventional military powers in the world—¶ and they all had nuclear weapons.¶ The fact that **major powers tend to be more involved in¶ international conflicts** than minor powers is not surprising.¶ Fighting international wars requires the capacity to project¶ substantial military power across national frontiers and often¶ over very long distances. Few countries have this capacity;¶ major powers have it by definition.¶ But there is a more serious challenge to the preponderance¶ thesis. From the end of World War II until the early 1970s,¶ nationalist struggles against colonial powers were the most¶ frequent form of international conflict. The **failure** of the far¶ more powerful colonial powers to prevail in these conflicts poses¶ a **serious challenge** to the core assumptions of preponderance¶ theories—and marked a remarkable historical change.¶ During most of the history of colonial expansion and rule¶ there had been little effective resistance from the inhabitants¶ of the territories that were being colonized. Indeed, as one¶ analyst of the wars of colonial conquest noted, “by and large, it¶ would seem true that what made the machinery of European¶ troops so successful was that native troops saw fit to die, with¶ glory, with honor, en masse, and in vain.”20¶ The ease of colonial conquest, the subsequent crushing¶ military defeats imposed on the Axis powers by the superior¶ military industrial might of the Allies in World War II, and the¶ previous failure of the UN’s predecessor, the League of Nations,¶ to stop Fascist aggression all served to reinforce the idea that¶ preponderance—superiority in military capability—was the¶ key both to peace through deterrence and victory in war.¶ But in the post-World War II world, new strategic realities¶ raised serious questions about assumptions regarding the¶ effectiveness of conventional military superiority. In particular,¶ the outcomes of the wars of colonial liberation, the US defeat¶ in Vietnam, and the Soviet defeat in Afghanistan demonstrated¶ that in some types of conflict, **military preponderance could¶ neither deter nationalist forces nor be used to defeat them**.¶ The outcomes of these conflicts posed a major challenge for¶ preponderance theories.¶ Not only did the vastly superior military capabilities of¶ the colonial powers **fail to deter** the nationalist rebels from¶ going to war but in every case it was **the nationalist forces¶ that prevailed**. The colonial powers withdrew and the colonies¶ gained independence. Military preponderance was strategically¶ **irrelevant**.¶ Writing about US strategy in Vietnam six years before the¶ end of the war, Henry Kissinger noted:¶ We fought a military war; our opponents fought a¶ political one. We sought physical attrition; our opponents¶ aimed for our psychological exhaustion. In the¶ process, we lost sight of one of the cardinal maxims¶ of guerrilla warfare: the guerrilla wins if he does not¶ lose. The conventional army loses if it does not win.21¶ For the nationalist forces, military engagements were¶ never intended to defeat the external power militarily—that¶ was impossible. The strategy was rather to seek the progressive¶ attrition of the metropole’s political capability to wage war—¶ “will” in the language of classical strategy.22 In such conflicts,¶ if the **human, economic, and reputational costs** to the external¶ power increase with **little prospect of victory**, support for the¶ war in the metropole will **steadily erode** and the pressure to¶ withdraw will inexorably increase.

**Their impacts are non-falsifiable junk – people don’t just start randomly fighting**

**Fettweis, 11**

Christopher J. Fettweis, Department of Political Science, Tulane University, 9/26/11, Free Riding or Restraint? Examining European Grand Strategy, Comparative Strategy, 30:316–332, EBSCO

Assertions that without the combination of U.S. capabilities, presence and commitments instability would return to Europe and the Pacific Rim are usually rendered in rather vague language. If the United States were to decrease its commitments abroad, argued Robert Art, “the world will become a more dangerous place and, sooner or later, that will redound to America’s detriment.”53 From where would this danger arise? Who precisely would do the fighting, and over what issues? Without the United States, would Europe really descend into Hobbesian anarchy? Would the Japanese attack mainland China again, to see if they could fare better this time around? Would the Germans and French have another go at it? In other words, where exactly is hegemony is keeping the peace? With one exception, these questions are rarely addressed. That exception is in the Pacific Rim. Some analysts fear that a de facto surrender of U.S. hegemony would lead to a rise of Chinese influence. Bradley Thayer worries that Chinese would become “the language of diplomacy, trade and commerce, transportation and navigation, the internet, world sport, and global culture,” and that Beijing would come to “dominate science and technology, in all its forms” to the extent that soon the world would witness a Chinese astronaut who not only travels to the Moon, but “plants the communist flag on Mars, and perhaps other planets in the future.”54 Indeed China is the only other major power that has increased its military spending since the end of the Cold War, even if it still is only about 2 percent of its GDP. Such levels of effort do not suggest a desire to compete with, much less supplant, the United States. The much-ballyhooed, decade-long military buildup has brought Chinese spending up to somewhere between one-tenth and one-fifth of the U.S. level. It is hardly clear that a restrained United States would invite Chinese regional, must less global, political expansion. Fortunately one need not ponder for too long the horrible specter of a red flag on Venus, since on the planet Earth, where war is no longer the dominant form of conflict resolution, the threats posed by even a rising China would not be terribly dire. The dangers contained in the terrestrial security environment are less severe than ever before. Believers in the pacifying power of hegemony ought to keep in mind a rather basic tenet: When it comes to policymaking, specific threats are more significant than vague, unnamed dangers. Without specific risks, it is just as plausible to interpret U.S. presence as redundant, as overseeing a peace that has already arrived. Strategy should not be based upon vague images emerging from the dark reaches of the neoconservative imagination. Overestimating Our Importance One of the most basic insights of cognitive psychology provides the final reason to doubt the power of hegemonic stability: Rarely are our actions as consequential upon their behavior as we perceive them to be. A great deal of experimental evidence exists to support the notion that people (and therefore states) tend to overrate the degree to which their behavior is responsible for the actions of others. Robert Jervis has argued that two processes account for this overestimation, both of which would seem to be especially relevant in the U.S. case.55 First, believing that we are responsible for their actions gratifies our national ego (which is not small to begin with; the United States is exceptional in its exceptionalism). The hubris of the United States, long appreciated and noted, has only grown with the collapse of the Soviet Union.56 U.S. policymakers famously have comparatively little knowledge of—or interest in—events that occur outside of their own borders. If there is any state vulnerable to the overestimation of its importance due to the fundamental misunderstanding of the motivation of others, it would have to be the United States. Second, policymakers in the United States are far more familiar with our actions than they are with the decision-making processes of our allies. Try as we might, it is not possible to fully understand the threats, challenges, and opportunities that our allies see from their perspective. The European great powers have domestic politics as complex as ours, and they also have competent, capable strategists to chart their way forward. They react to many international forces, of which U.S. behavior is only one. Therefore, for any actor trying to make sense of the action of others, Jervis notes, “in the absence of strong evidence to the contrary, the most obvious and parsimonious explanation is that he was responsible.”57 It is natural, therefore, for U.S. policymakers and strategists to believe that the behavior of our allies (and rivals) is shaped largely by what Washington does. Presumably Americans are at least as susceptible to the overestimation of their ability as any other people, and perhaps more so. At the very least, political psychologists tell us, we are probably not as important to them as we think. The importance of U.S. hegemony in contributing to international stability is therefore almost certainly overrated. In the end, one can never be sure why our major allies have not gone to, and do not even plan for, war. Like deterrence, the hegemonic stability theory rests on faith; it can only be falsified, never proven. It does not seem likely, however, that hegemony could fully account for twenty years of strategic decisions made in allied capitals if the international system were not already a remarkably peaceful place. Perhaps these states have no intention of fighting one another to begin with, and our commitments are redundant. European great powers may well have chosen strategic restraint because they feel that their security is all but assured, with or without the United States.

**AT: Neolib**

**Their starting point is wrong—their authors assume neoliberalism is inevitable which distorts their idea of social justice—also empiricism proves this argument is factually incorrect**

**Gindin 2002** (Sam, Sam Gindin is a Canadian academic and intellectual who served as research director of the Canadian region of the United Auto Workers (UAW) union and later as chief economist and Assistant to the President of the Canadian Auto Workers (CAW) union after the latter became independent from its American parent organization.¶ Gindin is a graduate of the University of Manitoba. He worked as a research officer for the New Democratic Party of Manitoba and later taught at the University of Prince Edward Island. He obtained his MA in economics from the University of Wisconsin–Madison, but while working on his PhD dissertation in 1974, he took up the position of first director of research for what was then the Canadian section of the UAW. He rose within the union and served as an assistant to both Bob White and Buzz Hargrove, where he participated in major collective bargaining, the formation of union and social policy, and strategic discussions on the structure and direction of the union. He also wrote a book on the history of the CAW entitled The Canadian Auto Workers: The Birth and Transformation of a Union. “Social Justice and Globalization: Are they Compatible?”, <http://monthlyreview.org/2002/06/01/social-justice-and-globalization-are-they-compatible>)

In a speech in 1999, Henry Kissinger, secretary of state under Presidents Nixon and Ford, candidly remarked that “globalization” is another term for U.S. domination.1 Such clarity tends, in itself, to negatively answer the question posed in the title of this talk. How can anyone argue that U.S. domination—or using the less polite term, “U.S. imperialism”—is compatible with social justice?¶ Similarly, if we agree that a minimum precondition for any notion of social justice is the extension of people’s democratic ability to shape their lives, that too might reinforce skepticism about globalization’s compatibility with social justice. Especially if we see globalization as being largely about establishing global rules that act as a constitution for investor rights, and which are beyond any parliamentary challenges. And if we went further and defined a socially just world as one that supported the full and mutual development of the potential capacities of every individual, I imagine that many—if not most of us—would judge globalization to be inconsistent with that ideal.¶ And yet things refuse to stay that simple or clear. Even if Kissinger has helped us see the obvious, **aren’t many countries, and citizens of those countries, anxious for U.S. investment?** Isn’t it true that the Canadian government, far from being forced into the free trade agreement, begged for that integration into the United States? Is China wrong when it argues that access to U.s. markets, technology, and capital will facilitate its development and that such development is a critical base for social justice? Would we disagree with the World Bank when it argues that countries that have either rejected globalization, or are now being ignored by globalization, do not seem better off for that fact? Part of the confusion lies in ambiguities about what we mean by globalization and how we think about social justice. But it is more than that: it is also that **our sense of social justice is affected by what we believe is possible.** In the absence of alternatives to the U.S. Empire, and in the absence of the political capacity to put such alternatives on the agenda, our dreams are trimmed to fit the bed of “reality.” Social justice is made compatible with globalization, not by transforming society, **but by shrinking our ideals**.¶ This limiting of hope was perhaps the main measure of the world-wide defeat of the last generation. In spite of the inspiration of Seattle and its aftermath, that sense of defeat is still pervasive. Social justice demands reviving the determination to dream. Its not just that dreaming is essential for maintaining any resistance, but because today, **if we do not think big**—as big as the globalizers themselves think—**we will not even win small**.¶ It’s from this perspective that I’d like to consider, and draw some conclusions from, two apparently opposite alternatives that try to find some compatibility between globalization and social justice: one seeks a return to the social democracy of capitalism’s “golden age,” while the other emphasizes building a community-based “social economy.” But first, a brief historical point on globalization.¶ Globalization is not new. A century and a half ago, Karl Marx noted the inherent capitalist drive to “nestle everywhere, settle everywhere, establish connections everywhere.…In place of the old national seclusion and self-sufficiency, we have intercourse in every direction, the universal interdependence of nations.”2 By the last quarter of the nineteenth century, globalization was an assumed fact of life: world commodity prices were the central reality in the lives of millions of Continental [European] peasants; the repercussions of the London market were daily noted by business men all over the world; and governments discussed plans for the future in light of the situation on the world capital markets. Only a madman would have doubted that the international economic system was the axis of the material existence of the human race.3¶ But if globalization was integral to capitalism, its long-term stability was far from inevitable. In fact, the very globalization which “only a madman might have doubted” at the end of the nineteenth century, **came to a sudden and crashing halt** early in the twentieth. That breakdown in world order came with the horrifying slaughter of the First World War, followed—after a brief respite in the 1920’s—by the stunning collapse of national economies in the form of the Great Depression and the political rise of German, Italian, and Japanese Fascism. And then came another horrific world war. This catastrophic failure of capitalism’s globalization meant that, by the end of the Second World War, the former glory of this system was replaced, as one observer summarized it, by “…the amazing unpopularity of capitalism everywhere in Europe.…[and] everyone sought to appropriate left credentials.”4¶ It was in response to that earlier failure that a new globalization was reconstructed. The U.S. state, with its overwhelming postwar resources and power, consciously shaped that globalization. It didn’t follow market pressures, but led them. Determined to avoid the disaster of the previous era of globalization and its threat to capitalism itself, the U.S. state set out to minimize the opposition between national and international economies. The goal was to rebuild devastated national economies while also integrating them into global networks. The U.S.-led internationalization of economic, political, and military ties didn’t weaken national states but, by supporting growth and weakening domestic opposition, it actually strengthened the national status quo and the national state.¶ Those first postwar decades managed to combine a less aggressive globalization, a space for national autonomy, and states responsive to popular pressures—factors which, together, brought growing material prosperity and a measure of equality. It’s therefore not surprising that some are still hanging on to a return to the structures of that earlier period as a practical response to making globalization more compatible with social justice. The discouraging state of the present tends, however, to a wishful enhancement of the past. That “golden age” of capitalism, in fact, fell far short of any ideal of social justice: **internal poverty persisted**; the gap between the first world and the third, in spite of decolonization, widened; it was hardly a “golden age” for women or for U.S. blacks; workers still sold their labor and potentials to others, gaining the power to consume but not actively to shape their community; and corporate rule was not reduced but reinforced. The youth rebellions of the 1960s, we should remember, went beyond opposition to the war in Vietnam and reacted against the empty materialism of the times and—in the case of young factory workers—reacted against the contrast between their civil rights in society and the authoritarianism of their workplaces.¶ In any case, such a return to the past is simply not possible. History doesn’t allow us to go into reverse that easily. It is crucial to understand that neoliberalism and the speed-up of globalization over the past two decades didn’t just happen. They were a reaction to particular domestic and international developments within that “golden age.” Capitalism, as a social system, could not live with the rise in equality and security for workers. The working class victories and concessions from business were not calming but raising expectations, and they were undermining discipline: they were threatening profits, class power, and class rule. What were earlier viewed as measures of progress—higher wages, better social programs, greater security—were redefined as barriers that blocked capitalism’s own needs.

And it was those needs which demanded the deepening and expansion of market-logic known as neoliberalism.¶ The intensification of globalization fit perfectly with neoliberalism. The changes in the degree of globalization in the seventies, and even more so after the eighties, had roots in longer term developments and especially in the U.S. response to new challenges from Europe, Japan, and third world rebellions. But it was also a logical extension of neoliberalism. Globalization provided, on behalf of capital, an additional disciplining pressure on domestic populations and institutions that was faceless, placeless, and bloodlessly unsympathetic.¶ The point is that the distance between the “golden age” and the present is about more than particular restorable policies. Major structural changes have occurred in the distribution of power and this includes changes within capitalist classes everywhere. It is clear, for example, that, at least since the free trade debates, it is no longer possible to talk about a Canadian business class oriented to national economic development. Every major sector of business is now dominated by an international, or more accurately, continental perspective. A nationalist alliance between progressive forces and sections of business, which some doubted was possible in the seventies, is certainly no longer possible given the changes since then. Without that base of business support, any attempt to significantly change Canada will have to depend more than ever on a more mobilized popular base and will, of necessity, have to be more radical in terms of replacing unified and antagonistic corporate owners with democratic public ownership.¶ A quite different set of alternatives, rooted in the new movements rather than in the past, has recently emerged and drawn excitement. It has been loosely labeled the “social economy.” It has strong roots throughout the world and has developed a very significant base in Québec. It is remarkably diverse, so I want to be careful in generalizing about it, but some perspectives do seem widely common to its various components. There is a common antipathy against competition and the drive for profits, and a counterfocus on solidarity and production/exchange for use. And, like many others in the antiglobalization protests, it is skeptical of traditional left politics—that is, of political parties, of concerns with capturing state power, and of addressing how corporate property relations might be socialized and democratized. While it is generally a committed participant in the antiglobalization movement, its energy has increasingly been directed to the immediate development of an alternative economy—a social economy—at the community level.¶ There are appealing aspects to this orientation. Where it is involved with concrete issues of survival—addressing desperate community needs for food, water, health—it is clearly doing crucial work. Its diversity and role in mobilizing and developing technical and democratic skills is impressive. Its criticisms of traditional politics include observations that are clearly valid. And its determination to experiment with alternative forms of ownership and community participation include valuable lessons for any progressive movement.¶ Yet an obvious question emerges. **If globalization is really so large in scale and scope, how can it be overcome by a movement that leaves corporate and state structures intact;** that (implicitly at least) accepts continued private control of the overwhelming proportion of our common resources and society’s accumulated knowledge; that restricts itself, apparently permanently, to the fringes of social decision-making and power? The global establishment, in spite of some initial nervousness, has come to understand that this movement for a social economy, when it does not aim higher, is not a threat. It has consequently been rather accommodating to it, describing it as the newly emerging “global civil society” and as “globalization from below.”5 Corporations, banks, private foundations, governments, and regional institutions have been happy and sometimes anxious to provide funding. And in the absence of a political context, all have been happy to incorporate the abstract language of “empowerment,” “community democracy,” and “capacities.”¶ It is not just that the elites view this trend as being safe, but that they also see it as being functional to globalization. With privatization and the erosion of social services, the attempt to provide decentralized alternatives may—inadvertently—legitimate, or at least act to limit opposition to, the regressive changes. In extreme but not uncommon cases, like the Québec Solidarity Fund with its tax breaks to create worker-investors, government partnerships directly integrate social economy institutions into the state.¶ Again, I want to be careful not to ignore differences within this movement. It is one thing, as in Porto Alegre, where the movement includes many activists tied to a larger, politicized, anticapitalist project. But where this is not the case, the social economy movement ironically suffers from the same limits it sees in the social democratic parties it has so much contempt for. Not oriented to mobilizing against corporate power, it becomes either peripheral to change or is incorporated into the system.¶ Just as globalization can’t be changed by a retreat into the past, it can’t be changed by a retreat to its margins. What Marx understood so well when he criticized the Utopians of his time was that if you don’t bring your dreams into the belly of the beast—if you try to build around, rather than against global power—you ultimately offer illusions rather than hope. Globalization and social justice can’t be made compatible by leaving globalization intact and confining social justice to the world outside globalization’s walls. But is there any basis for believing that globalization, that is to say modern capitalism, can be challenged? There are those who believe that capitalism will collapse from its internal contradictions; I consider this to be one of the weakest aspects of the Marxist legacy. There are, I believe, particular developments within capitalism that leave openings for its legitimacy to be challenged, and the authority of its elites questioned. But capitalism will only end when there is a movement with the vision, confidence, and capacity to replace it.¶ In the third world, the basis for mobilizing a challenge to capitalism revolves around one particular fact, increasingly evident after a half century of failures of various models: capitalism/globalization cannot, in general, bring to the third world the kind of material development achieved in the first. In the first world, the opening lies in the question of whether what has been achieved is in fact the best humans can strive for.¶ **Global inequality has been rising relentlessly.** The World Bank—a prominent player in articulating globalization as both good and necessary, and keenly aware of the political implications of this historical record of growing global inequality—has acknowledged that globalization has left billions of people behind. Its argument now is that some countries have grown through entering the global economy and that these “globalizers” suggest a positive future for the rest of the third world, that “globalization is the key to social justice.”6¶ This sham argument ignores, first, that where growth has come, **it has come not with a general improvement in social justice but with costs in terms of internal democracy, human rights, and equality.** In the mid-fifties, a Latin American general, when asked about economic development in his country, responded with words that still capture so much of the present reality in third world **so-called success stories like** Brazil and **Mexico**: “**The economy is doing great, but the people in it aren’t**.”¶ Second, the few success stories, like those in South East Asia, have proved to be fragile, and in any case have been rooted in particular circumstances that can’t be duplicated. The most prominent example, South Korea, did not achieve what it did because its policies were so clever—though they were relevant—but because of its special importance to the United States during the Cold War. This meant that, like Europe before (and unlike the third world more generally) it received a form of Marshall Aid (military spending during the Korean and Vietnam wars) and was also given free access to the U.S. market even as it protected its own markets. Third, as long as the successful development model is focused on poor countries competing to export to the West, universal development is a contradiction in terms. Some “winners” might indeed emerge, **but only by condemning other countries to being losers** (not to mention the losers within their own countries). **The third world can only move towards overall development if there is a focus on mobilizing and developing their human and natural resources to address internal needs**. They do not have to cut themselves off from trade and investment, though they must insist on tightly regulating them to strengthen their internal development.¶ A look at the history of U.S. development—as well as that of Germany and Japan—exposes the hypocrisy of lecturing the third world against nationalist intervention. In 1791, Alexander Hamilton, the first secretary of the treasury called for “energetic” government to ensure growth and argued:¶ all the difference is lost to a community which, instead of manufacturing for itself, procures…its supply from other countries. The substitution of foreign for domestic manufacturing is a transfer to foreign nations of the advantages occurring from the employment of machinery.¶ Sometime later, James Madison, a principal author of the U.S. Constitution and later president of the United States, asserted:¶ The power [to regulate trade] has been understood and used by all commercial and manufacturing nations, as embracing the object of encouraging manufactures. It is believed that not a single exception could be found.¶ Later in the nineteenth century, Abraham Lincoln added:¶ I do not know much about the tariff, but I do know this much, when we buy manufactured goods abroad, we get the goods and the foreigners get the money. When we buy the manufactured goods at home we get both the goods and the money.¶ And at the beginning of the twentieth century another U.S. president, William McKinley, boasted that: We lead all nations in agriculture; we lead all nations in mining; we lead in manufacturing. These are the trophies we bring after [several decades] of a protective tariff.7¶ There have of course been movements within the third world—some inspired by their reading of the history of the West, some inspired by Marxism—that have clearly understood that another path to development was crucial. This implied that domestic conflict was necessary to change internal social structures and relationships—the problem has never simply been that of external domination. But where this threatened corporate and particularly U.S. interests, then the reality of Kissinger’s definition of globalization as U.S. dominance stepped to the fore. New York Times columnist Thomas Friedman, in full support of that power, explained to readers the other side of free trade, “the hidden hand of the market will never work without a hidden fist…the hidden fist that keeps the world safe for Silicon Valley’s technologies is called the United States Army, Air Force, Navy, and Marine Corps.”8¶ The movements of any country—whether communist, socialist, or nationalist—that aimed to break out of the rules established by the West were **ruthlessly crushed, condemning those countries to continuing misery, issuing a warning to others contemplating a similar path**, and—by destroying the secular opposition—opening the door to the alternative of religious mobilization and extremism. As the events of September 11 showed, and common sense should have forewarned, the costs of decisions made by elites in the first world could ultimately not be confined to the third world. Globalization did create one world—however unequal—not three, and aside from moral and human responsibilities, we are now implicated and affected by what happens everywhere.¶ In the developed West, the internal issue is not so much whether capitalism can deliver on economic growth as it is the nature of that growth. The welfare state emerged as a response to the issue of legitimating power in a class society. As the erosion of the welfare state continues, will capitalist legitimacy again be questioned? Liberal democratic rights—parliament, union rights, open access to the media and communications, civil liberties—also contribute to legitimating capitalism. Will the dramatic shift in power to global corporations, with its blatant declaration that only certain kinds of freedoms—those linked to private property—have any real priority under capitalism, raise questions about how democratic our society really is? A generation-long series of promises made to facilitate neoliberalism—restraints and concessions today will provide a better life and security tomorrow—have been broken. Will this lead to asking why the corporate executives who failed to deliver on those promises have been rewarded with incomes that reach the stratosphere? Will people see these incomes for what they are—a tax on the rest of us, but one we had no decision-making input into at all? Global financial instability and corruption are spread across the business pages. Will people look behind the scandals and beyond the Enrons to ask whether the rot, rather than being limited to any particular corporation, lies at the core values and workings of what capitalism has become? With the increased pressures in the workplace and at home, the longer hours and increased debt, will exhaustion turn into frustration and anger, anger into a re-evaluation of personal priorities and some kind of constructive action?¶ People do know something is wrong. You hear it in bars, on the streetcar, in classrooms, in general conversation, from characters in popular novels, and in the words and mood of contemporary songs. The issue, therefore, doesn’t lie so much in pointing out that something is wrong, but in developing a confidence to do something about it, developing an understanding of what that entails, and developing the organizational commitment to go ahead and do it.¶ The much-abused old left, for all its faults, did understand that the problem wasn’t just globalization, or finance, or neoliberal policies, or this or that scandal. The issue was the inherent lack of democracy in a society where a minority own the means of production we all depend on and the means of communications we need to speak to each other. They understood that moving toward a society that supported the full development of each of our potentials meant that capitalism had ultimately to be replaced.¶ Critics sympathetic to that project nevertheless and rightfully pointed to the left’s own lack of internal democracy, its narrow view of class and rigidity with regard to other forms of oppression, its overemphasis on the state relative to the movement from below, and its loss of creativity. A new generation is entering this debate. Any success in building a movement to challenge capitalism in the name of social justice will depend on whether the insights of the old left, the criticisms leveled against it, and the energy of the new activists can find that elusive common ground.¶ One particular question will have a special influence on that coming together: how we relate the national to the international. Any movement for social justice must be solidaristic and internationalist in its sentiments and actions. Yet any movement that hopes to sustain itself and grow must be rooted locally and nationally; it must not only link up with students abroad, but win over workers at home.¶ The Canadian antiglobalization movement is currently preparing for the G-8 meetings in Kananaskis, Alberta. As in Québec, the Canadian movement wants to use this opportunity to confirm its place and responsibility within the international movement. Perhaps we can add to that contribution by acting concretely to link the national and the international more closely. In addition to the pro forma demands to end the debt and increase aid, why don’t we make demands on our own government, as host, to show some leadership and act unilaterally to end our share of that debt, and raise our aid commitments to at least the levels promised but never delivered? Why not use this moment to demand that our government do something about the third world within our first world—for example, responding to poverty and homelessness by establishing housing as a universal right in Canada; or by extending legal status to immigrants who are welcome to work here, but are especially vulnerable because they are denied the formal rights Canadian workers have. Conventional wisdom has it that the national state, whether we like it or not, is no longer a relevant site of struggle. At one level, this is true. If our notion of the state is that of an institution which left governments can “capture” and push in a different direction, experience suggests this will contribute little to social justice. But if our goal is to transform the state into an instrument for popular mobilization and the development of democratic capacities, to bring our economy under popular control and restructure our relationships to the world economy, then winning state power would manifest the worst nightmares of the corporate world.¶ **When we reject strategies based on winning through undercutting others and maintain our fight for dignity and justice nationally, we can inspire others abroad and create new spaces for their own struggles**. In that way we internationalize the struggle for social justice. The hope for social justice lies in this kind of national-internationalism, not globalization.

### Ag

**2NC Authoritarianism K**

**Environmental apocalypticism results in eco-authoritarianism – that’s Buell – people run to find scapegoats for environmental problems and populations are mobilized against entities that are perceived to be dangerous to the global order – it also creates a permanent state of exception as the sovereign holds in its hands the power over all life – this ensures mass atrocity**

**Agamben 98** – professor of philosophy at university of Verona (Giorgio, Homo Sacer: Sovereign Power and Bare Life, pg. 139-140)

It is not our intention here to take a position on the difficult ethical problem of euthanasia, which still today, in certain coun­tries, occupies a substantial position in medical debates and pro­vokes disagreement. Nor are we concerned with the radicaliry with which Binding declares himself in favor of the general admissibility of euthanasia. More interesting for our inquiry is the fact that the sovereignty of the living man over his own life has its immediate counterpart in the determination of a threshold beyond which life ceases to have any juridical value and can, therefore, be killed without the commission of a homicide. The new juridical category of “life devoid of value” (or “life unworthy of being lived”) corre­sponds exactly—even if in an apparently different direction—to the bare life of homo sacer and can easily be extended beyond the limits imagined by Binding. It is as if every valorization and every “politicization” of life (which, after all, is implicit in the sovereignty of the individual over his own existence) necessarily implies a new decision concerning the threshold beyond which life ceases to be politically relevant, becomes only “sacred life,” and can as such be eliminated without punishment. Every society sets this limit; every society—even the most modern—decides who its “sacred men” will be. It is even pos­sible that this limit, on which the politicization and the exceprio of natural life in the juridical order of the state depends, has done nothing but extend itself in the history of the West and has now— in the new biopolitical horizon of states with national sovereignty—moved inside every human life and every citizen. Bare life is no longer confined to a particular place or a definite category. It now dwells in the biological body of every living being.

**Furthermore, political scapegoating ensures targeting of the third world**

**Gilbert 12**

Emily Gilbert, Canadian Studies and Geography University of Toronto, 2012, "The Militarization of Climate Change," ACME: An International E-Journal for Critical Geographies, 11 (1), 1-14 7

First, the military’s interest in climate change resurrects a narrow concept of security. Although the 2010 QDR recognizes impending concerns associated with human security (eg migration, disease and food security), it models the anticipated conflict through a traditional state-to-state war scenario, refracted through a neo- Malthusian conflict over resources (Dalby, 2009; Homer-Dixon, 1999). Resource conflict and other climate change impacts are mapped onto already vulnerable places in Sub Saharan Africa, the Middle East, and South and Southeast Asia (Broder, 2009; CNA, 2007; Podesta and Ogden, 2007-08; Werz and Manlove, 2009), where, it is argued, they will act as ‘threat multipliers’ that will escalate into ‘failed state’ scenarios. This perpetuates a model whereby the enemy to the nation is elsewhere, and that ‘environmental threats are something that foreigners do to Americans or to American territory,’ not as a result of domestic policies (Eckersley 2009: 87). In this vein, the CIA has established a Center on Climate Change and National Security to collect foreign ‘intelligence’ on the national security impact of environmental change in other parts of the world.6

The bifurcation of domestic security and external threat reinforces a fiction of territorial and nationalist integrity, and works against thinking about climate change **as a global problem with a need for global responsibility and global solutions** (Dalby 2009: 50; Deudney 1999: 189).7 Moreover, the model of external threats coheres easily with the competitive frame that has been established between China and the US, as they vie not only for economic ascendency and resource- acquisition, but also for energy security and environmental policies and initiatives.8 In this vein, Thomas Freidman has proposed a militant green nationalism, something along the lines of a triumphalist Green New Deal that will recapture US global hegemony (Friedman, 2009).9 Achieving this result requires, however, more political agreement across US Democrats and Republicans, and it is precisely here that reframing climate change as a military issue seems to be an effective strategy for cross-partisan agreement.10 But what are the costs when militarization becomes necessary to legitimize climate change action?

The upshot is that the military is also legitimized, to the detriment of formal and informal politics. In a secretive and hierarchical military framework there is limited scope for public participation or legislative debate (UNEP 2007: 403). Militaries are about the ‘maintenance of elite power’ (Barnett 2001: 25). Issues regarding social justice are disregarded in favour of national objectives, while the vulnerabilities institutionalized through climate change are perpetuated (Barnett, 2006). This is particularly apparent vis-à-vis environmental refugees, which the Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change estimates will swell to 150 million by 2050 (Reuveny, 2007). Militarism encourages the use of force against foreigners, with barriers erected to exclude those who bear the immediate impact of climate change, even though they are usually the least responsible for climate change. As Paul Smith notes, Operation Seal Signal, which the US deployed in 1994 to deal with 50,000 refugees from Haiti and Cuba, offers an instructive example of how the military addresses refugees, most of whom were held at Guantanamo Bay while their cases were processed (Smith, 2007). The responses to human tragedy in Haiti and Hurricane Katrina, when military priorities took hold over the immediate needs of the racialized, impoverished victims, speaks to the dangers of concocting security threats so that abandonment is prioritized over assistance (Giroux, 2006; Hallward, 2010). This is part of a worrisome trend of the rise of an ‘aid-military complex’ and military ‘encroachment’ on civilian-sponsored development (Hartmann 2010: 240).

**That guarantees global war and extinction**

**Brzoska 8** (Michael Brzoska, Institute for Peace Research and Security Policy at the University of Hamburg; “The securitization of climate change and the power of conceptions of security,” Paper prepared for the International Studies Association Convention, 2008)

In the literature on securitization it is implied that when a problem is securitized it is difficult to limit this to an increase in attention and resources devoted to mitigating the problem (Brock 1997, Waever 1995). Securitization regularly leads to all-round ‘exceptionalism’ in dealing with the issue as well as to a shift in institutional localization towards ‘security experts’ (Bigot 2006), such as the military and police. Methods and instruments associated with these security organizations – such as more **use of arms, force and violence – will gain in importance in the** discourse on ‘what to do’. A good example of securitization was the period leading to the Cold War (Guzzini 2004 ). Originally a political conflict over the organization of societies, in the late 1940s, the East-West confrontation became an existential conflict that was overwhelmingly addressed with military means, including the potential annihilation of humankind. Efforts to alleviate the political conflict were, throughout most of the Cold War, secondary to improving military capabilities. **Climate change could meet a similar fate**. An essentially political problem concerning the distribution of the costs of prevention and adaptation and the losses and gains in income arising from change in the human environment might **be perceived as intractable, thus necessitating** the **build-up of military and police forces** to prevent it from becoming a major security problem. The portrayal of climate change as a security problem could, in particular, cause the richer countries in the global North, which are less affected by it, **to strengthen measures aimed at protecting them from** the spillover of violent conflict from the poorer countries in the global South that will be most affected by climate change. It could also be used by major powers as a justification for improving their military preparedness against the other major powers, thus **leading to arms races.**

**2NC War turns ag**

War outweighs warming

a. **Securitization undermines cooperation – turns the case**

**Trombetta 8** (Maria Julia Trombetta, postdoctoral researcher at the department of Economics of Infrastructures, Delft University of Technology; “Environmental security and climate change: analysing the discourse,” Outh Cambridge Review of International Affairs, Volume 21, Number 4, December 2008)

Opponents were quick to warn that the term 'security' **evokes a set of confrontational practices** associated with the state and the military which **should be kept apart from the environmental debate** (Deudney 1990). Concerns included the possibilities of **creating new competencies for the military—militarizing the environment rather than greening security** (Kakonen 1994)—or the rise of **nationalistic attitudes** in order to protect the national environment (Deudney 1999, 466-468). Deudney argued that not only are practices and institutions associated with national security inadequate to deal with environmental problems, but security can also **introduce a zero-sum rationality** to the environmental debate that can create winners and losers, and **undermine the cooperative efforts** required by environmental problems. Similar objections came from a southern perspective: environmental security was perceived as a discourse about the security of northern countries, their **access to resources** and the **protection of their patterns of consumption**

(Shiva 1994; Dalby 1999; Barnett 2001). Although the debate waxed and waned, the concept slowly gained popularity. In April 2007 the security implications of climate change were discussed by the United Nations (UN) Security Council but the state representatives remained divided over the opportunity of considering climate change and, more generally, environmental degradation as a security issue (United Nations Security Council 2007).

The divide between those who oppose the use of the term environmental security by arguing that the logic of security is fixed and inflexible and those who support it by suggesting that the logic of security should be changed distracts attention away from the question of whether practices associated with providing security have been transformed by environmental security discourses. In the literature there is a debate about whether and how **security language transforms the method of dealing with an issue**—the debate focuses 'on the implications of using security language for the definition and governance of migration and the environment' (Huysmans 2006, 16)—but there is little on the reverse process or on the implications of using environmental language for the definition and governance of security. This article is an attempt to develop the latter type of analysis by exploring the meaning and function of environmental and climate security. The purpose is to consider how the use of a word in different contexts challenges and transforms the practices and meanings associated with it. It aims to explore 'what the practices of definition and usage do to a concept, and what the concept in turn does to the world into which it is inscribed' (Bartelson 2000,182). To undertake this analysis it is necessary to explore how different discourses about environmental and climate security have developed and **'conditioned the possibility of thought and action'** (181).

The article is presented in three parts. The first explores why the environment has been excluded from security considerations. By adopting a perspective that is **attentive to the social construction of security issues** and its implications, the article assesses the potential of a **discursive approach in transforming existing security practices**. The analysis draws on the theory of securitization elaborated by the Copenhagen School (inter alia Buzan and Waever 1998) and integrates it with elements borrowed from Beck's work (inter alia 1992, 1999, 2006) on risk society to provide a framework that accounts for transformation. It argues that the securitization of environmental issues can reorient security logics and practices. The second and third parts apply this framework to explore the development of environmental security and climate security discourses respectively.

## 1NR

### FW

Situatedness determines political efficacy

Dillon 99 (Michael Dillon, professor of politics at the University of Lancaster, 1999, “Moral Spaces: Rethinking Ethics and World Politics,” pp 97-8)

Heirs to all this, we find ourselves in the turbulent and now globalized wake of its confluence. As Heidegger-himself an especially revealing figure of the deep and mutual implication of the philosophical and the political4-never tired of pointing out, the relevance of ontology to all other kinds of thinking is fundamental and inescapable. For one cannot say anything about anything that is, without always already having made assumptions about the is as such. Any mode of thought, in short, always already carries an ontology sequestered within it. What this ontological turn does to other regional modes of thought is to challenge the ontology within which they operate. The implications of that review reverberate throughout the entire mode of thought, demanding a reappraisal as fundamental as the reappraisal ontology has demanded of philosophy. With ontology at issue, the entire foundations or underpinnings of any mode of thought are rendered problematic. This applies as much to any modern discipline of thought as it does to the question of modernity as such, with the exception, it seems, of science, which, having long ago given up the ontological questioning of when it called itself natural philosophy, appears now, in its industrialized and corporatized form, to be invulnerable to ontological perturbation. With its foundations at issue, the very authority of a mode of thought and the ways in which it characterizes the critical issues of freedom and judgment (of what kind of universe human beings inhabit, how they inhabit it, and what counts as reliable knowledge for them in it) is also put in question. The very ways in which Nietzsche, Heidegger, and other continental philosophers challenged Western ontology, simultaneously, therefore reposed the fundamental and inescapable difficulty, or aporia, for human being of decision and judgment. In other words, whatever ontology you subscribe to, knowingly or unknowingly, as a human being you still have to act. Whether or not you know or acknowledge it, the ontology you subscribe to will construe the problem of action for you in one way rather than another. You may think ontology is some arcane question of philosophy, but Nietzsche and Heidegger showed that it intimately shapes not only a way of thinking, but a way of being, a form of life. Decision, a fortiori political decision, in short, is no mere technique. It is instead a way of being that bears an understanding of Being, and of the fundaments of the human way of being within it. This applies, indeed applies most, to those mock innocent political slaves who claim only to be technocrats of decision making.

**Framing determines the outcomes of policy – uniquely true in the context of security**

**Calkivik 10** (Emine Asli Calkivik, PhD in political science from the University of Minnesota, October 2010, “Dismantling Security,” <http://purl.umn.edu/99479>) gz

In contrast to traditional approaches to security, which assume an objective¶ world that operates according to ahistorical formal models and rely on a statist¶ political ontology that naturalizes the meaning of what security is and how it can be¶ achieved,120 critical approaches attend to the relations of power that structure the¶ production of in/securities and expose the processes by which national identities and¶ what are deemed as a danger to those identities are constructed. A common point¶ shared by these engagements is their emphasis on the ethical dimension of scholarly¶ inquiry as well as the recognition that knowledge claims are always embedded in¶ relations of power. Their emphasis on the “ought” rather than the “is” reflects less a¶ reworking of the hierarchy between material and ideational power than an emphasis¶ on the social nature of global politics and an understanding that all phenomenon¶ pertaining to international relations exists through the cultural and ideological¶ structures through which they are given meaning and legitimated.121¶ Definition and construction of threats and the way in which states respond to¶ those threats constitutes one of the primary items on the agenda of critical scholars.122¶ While conventional analyses of security conceive threats as arising from material¶ capabilities of sovereign states located in a self-help system, critical approaches point¶ to the ways in which threats and intentions are not objectively given but socially¶ constructed: they involve history, culture, and power relations that cannot be reduced¶ to an objective measure of military capabilities. They investigate the ways in which¶ systems of signification and normative structures constrain or regulate collective¶ security practices or transform conduct in war. All of these studies reveal the¶ historically situated dynamics underlying practices that shape the desire to secure¶ bodies, nations, and states.¶ Primary examples of these engagements come from scholars working under¶ the broad banner of Constructivism.123 These scholars take as their premise the¶ proposition that interests and actions of states are socially constructed and therefore¶ subject to change. While leaving intact the traditional assumptions about military and¶ state-centric understandings of security, some of these studies nevertheless challenge¶ the traditional frameworks by explaining security practices through a recourse to¶ ideational elements such as norms and identities rather than relying on material¶ factors.124 In particular, these works challenge Neorealist and Neoliberal approaches,¶ which assume that states are rational, self-help actors in an anarchic environment. For¶ instance, Alexander Wendt in his seminal study shows how different (Hobbesian or¶ Kantian) anarchical cultures can play a role in channeling the security practices of¶ states on different paths.125 Focusing on international norms, such as the prohibitions¶ against the use of chemical and nuclear weapons or norms of humanitarian¶ intervention, other scholars argue that questions about international security cannot be¶ answered by Realist materialist explanations alone.126 An example to these¶ investigations is provided by Risse-Kappen, who argues that NATO’s post-Cold War¶ survival can only be explained with reference to ideational factors such as values and¶ identity—in this case, democratic, liberal values—that guarantee the institution’s¶ survival in the absence of a distinct threat.127¶ The post-Cold War security environment and proliferating threat discourses in¶ the absence of the “Soviet enemy” provide ample resource for scholars who focus on¶ the representational practices that played role in the construction of threats to state¶ security. For instance, Mutimer examines in detail the linguistic and metaphorical¶ construction of threats to the United States and its allies through the “image of¶ proliferation.”128 He points out the way in which a particular discursive framing of a¶ problem—in this case, the construction of the use of chemical or biological weapons¶ as a problem of proliferation as opposed to a problem of disarmament—shapes the¶ constitution of identities and interests of the actors in question and gives way to¶ particular patterns of foreign policy.¶ The discourse of threats and their social production—as well as the¶ construction of the objects of security as an inextricable aspect of security¶ discourses—constitutes an important item on the agenda of critical investigations.129¶ In conventional analyses, the purported state of nature populated by instrumentally¶ rational actors is taken as the departure point of analysis. Within this framework, the¶ state acts as the primary source of authority, the guarantor of order, and the primary¶ protector of the values and interests of these individuals. While the state is rendered¶ the locus of security, security of the state gets equated to the security of the citizen. In¶ contrast to the positing of the state as the locus of security with a neutrally given¶ interest of survival, critical scholars argue that a concept like national security needs to¶ be understood as a social construction rather than an objectively given fact. For¶ instance, in her case study of the Cuban missile crisis, Jutta Weldes shows how a core¶ concept such as the national interest is discursively constituted through¶ representational practices and linguistic elements.130 Other investigations explore the¶ working of security as a political practice, or the processes of construction of threats¶ through institutional mobilization and knowledge production. Some of these scholars¶ use “speech-act theory” to study how utterances of security constitute certain issues as¶ security problems.131¶ A related line of analysis, conducted mostly from post-structural and postcolonial¶ perspectives, is to trace the operation of power in its various guises and to¶ map the hierarchical relations, highlighting the gaps and silences of hegemonic¶ security narratives. In his Writing Security, David Campbell investigates how certain¶ risks are interpreted as dangers, what power effects these interpretative articulations¶ produce, and how they police the boundaries of the political community and produce¶ obedient subjects.132 Going against the grain of state-centric, strategic accounts of war,¶ scholars such as Michael Shapiro bring to focus the role of political violence in the¶ construction of the geopolitical imaginary and the production/ affirmation of collective¶ identity.133 Others focus on the international interventions that took place during the¶ 1990s and discuss the ways in which these imperial investments are legitimated by the¶ West through a moral discourse based on universal values.134¶ Other studies lay bare the historical biases, Eurocentric assumptions, and¶ racialized or gendered content of conceptions, analyses, theories, and practices of¶ security. Attending to the power of representation, they expose the links between¶ economies of power and “truth” in the re/production of international hierarchies and¶ in/securities. Problematizing the representation of post-colonial states as “failed” or¶ lacking, and hence as a major threat to international security, some of these scholars¶ demonstrate how these so-called failures were precisely the products of unequal¶ encounters with Western colonialism, pointing out the ways in which these¶ hierarchical relations were being reproduced through ongoing unequal economic,¶ social, and military relations.135 They analyze the construction of the non-Western¶ subject as the inferior other—“the Southern” or “the Oriental”—and attend to the¶ ways in which these representations are mobilized to legitimate certain security¶ practices and policies such as nuclear proliferation in the Third World.136 Introducing¶ feminist perspectives into their analyses, other scholars expose the gender biases¶ imbued in security practices, problematizing state security for rendering violence and¶ insecurity from the perspective of women.137

Giving the tool of imagination over to the state exonerates us from responsibility – we should imagine our own role in violence

**Kappeler 95** (Susanne, The Will to Violence, pgs 9-11)

War does not suddenly break out in a peaceful society; sexual violence is not the disturbance of otherwise equal gender relations. Racist attacks do not shoot like lightning out of a non-racist sky, and the sexual exploitation of children is no solitary problem in a world otherwise just to children. The violence of our most commonsense everyday thinking, and especially our personal will to violence, constitute the conceptual preparation , the ideological armament and the intellectual mobilization which make the 'outbreak' of war, of sexual violence , of racist attacks, of murder and destruction possible at all. 'We are the war,' writes Slavenka Drakulic at the end of her existential analysis of the question, 'what is war?': I do not know what war is, I want to tell my friend, but I see it everywhere . It is in the blood-soaked street in Sarajevo, after 20 people have been killed while they queued for bread. But it is also in your non-comprehension, in my unconscious cruelty towards you. in the fact that you have a yellow form [for refugees] and I don't, in the way in which it grows inside ourselves and changes our feelings, relationships, values - in short: us. We are the war. , , And I am afraid that we cannot hold anyone else responsible. We make this war possible , we permit it to happen. 'We are the war' - and we also are' the sexual violence , the racist violence , the exploitation and the will to violence in all its manifestations in a society in so-called 'peacetime", for we make them possible and we permit them to happen. 'We are the war' does not mean that the responsibility for a war is shared collectively and diffusely by an entire society - which would be equivalent to exonerating warlords and politicians and profiteers or, as Ulrich Beck says, upholding the notion of 'collective irresponsibility', where people are no longer held responsible for their actions, and where the conception of universal responsibility becomes the equivalent of a universal acquittal. 6 On the contrary, the object is precisely to analyse the specific and differential responsibility of everyone in their diverse situations. Decisions to unleash a war are indeed taken at particular levels of power by those in a position to make them and to command such collective action. We need to hold them clearly responsible for their decisions and actions without lessening theirs by any collective 'assumption' of responsibility. Yet our habit of focusing on the stage where the major dramas of power take place tends to obscure our sight in relation to our own sphere of competence, our own power and our own responsibility - leading to the well- known illusion of our apparent 'powerlessness' and its accompanying phenomenon - our so-called political disillusionment. Single citizens even more so those of other nations - have come to feel secure in their obvious non-responsibility for such large-scale political events as, say, the wars in Croatia and Bosnia-Herzegovina or Somalia \_ since the decisions for such events are always made elsewhere. Yet our insight that indeed we are not responsible for the decisions of a Serbian general or a Croatian president tends to mislead us in to thinking that therefore we have no responsibility at all, not even for forming our own judgment, and thus into underrating the responsibility we do have within our own sphere of action. In particular, it seems to absolve us from having to try to see any relation between our own actions and those events, or to recognize the connections between those political decisions and our own personal decisions. It not only shows that we participate in what Beck calls 'organized irresponsibility', upholding the apparent lack of connection between bureaucratically, institutionally, nationally and also individually organized separate competences. It also proves the phenomenal and unquestioned alliance of our personal thinking with the thinking of the major power mongers. For we tend to think that we cannot 'do ' anything , say, about a war, because we deem ourselves to be in the wrong situation; because we are not where the major decisions are made. Which is why many of those not yet entirely disillusioned with politics tend to engage in a form of mental deputy politics, in the style of 'What would I do if I were the general, the prime minister, the president, the foreign minister or the minister of defence?' Since we seem to regard their mega spheres of action as the only worthwhile and truly effective ones, and since our political analyses tend to dwell there first of all, any question of what I would do if I were indeed myself tends to peter out in the comparative insignificance of having what is perceived as 'virtually no possibilities': what I could do seems petty and futile. For my own action I obviously desire the range of action of a general, a prime minister, or a General Secretary of the UN - finding expression in ever more prevalent formulations like ‘I want to stop this war', 'I want military intervention ', 'I want to stop this backlash', or 'I want a moral revolution. '? 'We are this war', however, even if we do not command the troops or participate in so-called peace talks, namely as Drakulic says, in our 'non- comprehension' : our willed refusal to feel responsible for our own thinking and for working out our own understanding, preferring innocently to drift along the ideological current of prefabricated arguments or less than innocently taking advantage of the advantages these offer. And we 'are' the war in our 'unconscious cruelty towards you', our tolerance of the 'fact that you have a yellow form for refugees and I don 't' - our readiness, in other words, to build identities, one for ourselves and one for refugees, one of our own and one for the 'others'. We share in the responsibility for this war and its violence in the way we let them grow inside us, that is, in the way we shape 'our feelings, our relationships, our values' according to the structures and the values of war and violence.

More specifically, environmental reformism is merely an exercise in blame shifting and assuaging guilt, shielding us from ever having to take responsibility for our own personal complicity in the environmental crisis

Bobertz, 95 (Bradley, Nebraska Law, Legitimizing Pollution Through Pollution Control Laws: Reflections on Scapegoating Theory, 73 Tex. L. Rev. 711)

A routine pattern in environmental lawmaking is a tendency to blame environmental problems on easily identifiable objects or entities rather than on the social and economic practices that actually produce them. [n17](http://www.lexisnexis.com.proxygsu-wgc1.galileo.usg.edu/us/lnacademic/frame.do?tokenKey=rsh-20.453078.1478331385&target=results_DocumentContent&reloadEntirePage=true&rand=1236223023921&returnToKey=20_T5953416716&parent=docview#n17) Once identified as the culprit of an environmental problem, this blame-holder comes to symbolize and embody the problem itself. Lawmaking then begins to resemble a re-enactment of a scapegoat ritual, in which the community's misfortunes are symbolically transferred to an entity that is then banished or slain in order to cleanse the community of its collective wrongdoing and remove the source of its adversity. The topic of scapegoating is commonly encountered in studies of racism, [n18](http://www.lexisnexis.com.proxygsu-wgc1.galileo.usg.edu/us/lnacademic/frame.do?tokenKey=rsh-20.453078.1478331385&target=results_DocumentContent&reloadEntirePage=true&rand=1236223023921&returnToKey=20_T5953416716&parent=docview#n18) family psychology, [n19](http://www.lexisnexis.com.proxygsu-wgc1.galileo.usg.edu/us/lnacademic/frame.do?tokenKey=rsh-20.453078.1478331385&target=results_DocumentContent&reloadEntirePage=true&rand=1236223023921&returnToKey=20_T5953416716&parent=docview#n19) and mass sociology, [n20](http://www.lexisnexis.com.proxygsu-wgc1.galileo.usg.edu/us/lnacademic/frame.do?tokenKey=rsh-20.453078.1478331385&target=results_DocumentContent&reloadEntirePage=true&rand=1236223023921&returnToKey=20_T5953416716&parent=docview#n20) but is not often associated with law and legal scholarship. Nevertheless, parallels appear to exist between the general scapegoat phenomenon and environmental lawmaking.The term "scapegoat" derives from the guilt offerings ceremony set forth in the biblical book of Leviticus. According to the Levitical  [\*717]  scapegoat ceremony, Aaron placed both hands on the head of a live goat and confessed the sins of the people of Israel. [n21](http://www.lexisnexis.com.proxygsu-wgc1.galileo.usg.edu/us/lnacademic/frame.do?tokenKey=rsh-20.453078.1478331385&target=results_DocumentContent&reloadEntirePage=true&rand=1236223023921&returnToKey=20_T5953416716&parent=docview#n21) Having thereby transferred the collective guilt of the people to the goat, he drove the goat into the desert "to carry off their iniquities to an isolated region." [n22](http://www.lexisnexis.com.proxygsu-wgc1.galileo.usg.edu/us/lnacademic/frame.do?tokenKey=rsh-20.453078.1478331385&target=results_DocumentContent&reloadEntirePage=true&rand=1236223023921&returnToKey=20_T5953416716&parent=docview#n22) This ceremony was to be repeated each year on the Day of Atonement. Other sacrifice rituals, including the "sin offering for the community" [n23](http://www.lexisnexis.com.proxygsu-wgc1.galileo.usg.edu/us/lnacademic/frame.do?tokenKey=rsh-20.453078.1478331385&target=results_DocumentContent&reloadEntirePage=true&rand=1236223023921&returnToKey=20_T5953416716&parent=docview#n23) and the "guilt offerings," [n24](http://www.lexisnexis.com.proxygsu-wgc1.galileo.usg.edu/us/lnacademic/frame.do?tokenKey=rsh-20.453078.1478331385&target=results_DocumentContent&reloadEntirePage=true&rand=1236223023921&returnToKey=20_T5953416716&parent=docview#n24) were to be performed on a periodic basis. Essentially identical, [n25](http://www.lexisnexis.com.proxygsu-wgc1.galileo.usg.edu/us/lnacademic/frame.do?tokenKey=rsh-20.453078.1478331385&target=results_DocumentContent&reloadEntirePage=true&rand=1236223023921&returnToKey=20_T5953416716&parent=docview#n25) these other ceremonies involve the slaying of a young bull as a means for forgiving inadvertent transgressions of the people. [n26](http://www.lexisnexis.com.proxygsu-wgc1.galileo.usg.edu/us/lnacademic/frame.do?tokenKey=rsh-20.453078.1478331385&target=results_DocumentContent&reloadEntirePage=true&rand=1236223023921&returnToKey=20_T5953416716&parent=docview#n26)Other cultures also employ similar sacrifice rituals to expunge evils brought about by the collective misconduct of the community. Beginning with James Frazer's The Golden Bough, [n27](http://www.lexisnexis.com.proxygsu-wgc1.galileo.usg.edu/us/lnacademic/frame.do?tokenKey=rsh-20.453078.1478331385&target=results_DocumentContent&reloadEntirePage=true&rand=1236223023921&returnToKey=20_T5953416716&parent=docview#n27) anthropologists have catalogued a remarkable variety of sacrifice rituals intended to expel collective sin. [n28](http://www.lexisnexis.com.proxygsu-wgc1.galileo.usg.edu/us/lnacademic/frame.do?tokenKey=rsh-20.453078.1478331385&target=results_DocumentContent&reloadEntirePage=true&rand=1236223023921&returnToKey=20_T5953416716&parent=docview#n28) Despite subtle variations in form and emphasis, these ceremonies follow a remarkably similar pattern: the participants view the ritual as a necessary measure for expelling collective wrongdoing, often after some misfortune or calamity has befallen the community. [n29](http://www.lexisnexis.com.proxygsu-wgc1.galileo.usg.edu/us/lnacademic/frame.do?tokenKey=rsh-20.453078.1478331385&target=results_DocumentContent&reloadEntirePage=true&rand=1236223023921&returnToKey=20_T5953416716&parent=docview#n29) Often, both the transference of the community's sins to the scapegoat object and the sacrifice of the object itself are performed by persons having special standing in the community, typically of a religious character. [n30](http://www.lexisnexis.com.proxygsu-wgc1.galileo.usg.edu/us/lnacademic/frame.do?tokenKey=rsh-20.453078.1478331385&target=results_DocumentContent&reloadEntirePage=true&rand=1236223023921&returnToKey=20_T5953416716&parent=docview#n30) [\*718]  While we might view these sacrifice rituals as acts of merely symbolic import, the participants themselves clearly believe the ceremonies accomplish their desired ends. The people of Southern Africa do not place the blood of their sick people on the head of a goat (which is then banished to the veldt) to engage the curiosity of European anthropologists. They simply intend to make sick people well. [n31](http://www.lexisnexis.com.proxygsu-wgc1.galileo.usg.edu/us/lnacademic/frame.do?tokenKey=rsh-20.453078.1478331385&target=results_DocumentContent&reloadEntirePage=true&rand=1236223023921&returnToKey=20_T5953416716&parent=docview#n31) Likewise, the people put to death in Salem were killed because they were thought (proven!) to be witches, not because they were personifications of some other social anxiety. [n32](http://www.lexisnexis.com.proxygsu-wgc1.galileo.usg.edu/us/lnacademic/frame.do?tokenKey=rsh-20.453078.1478331385&target=results_DocumentContent&reloadEntirePage=true&rand=1236223023921&returnToKey=20_T5953416716&parent=docview#n32) To the detached observer, the bizarre and gruesome aspects of the ceremonies may stand out, but the participants do what they do because they believe it will work. [n33](http://www.lexisnexis.com.proxygsu-wgc1.galileo.usg.edu/us/lnacademic/frame.do?tokenKey=rsh-20.453078.1478331385&target=results_DocumentContent&reloadEntirePage=true&rand=1236223023921&returnToKey=20_T5953416716&parent=docview#n33)This Article is not intended to support the notion that the targets of environmental regulation, in one way or another, are "scapegoats" in the common understanding of the term -- deserving of pity and freedom from compliance with environmental laws. Instead, I intend to shed light on a simple but troubling pattern: Environmental legislation is more likely to emerge from the lawmaking process when the problem it seeks to control is readily symbolized by an identifiable object, entity, or person -- a "scapegoat" in the sense discussed above. In the absence of such a scapegoat, however, lawmakers are less likely to take action. This pattern is particularly problematic because the identified scapegoat often bears an incomplete or distorted relationship to the actual problem at hand, resulting in laws that are likewise incomplete or distorted. As discussed below in Part V, because we deal harshly with culturally accepted symbols of environmental problems, it is less likely that we will deal with the problems (and their causes) themselves. For anyone concerned about the correlation between social problems and the legal regimes we create to solve them, this phenomenon should be cause for concern.

### AT: Disease

Gomel 2000(Elana Gomel, English department head at Tel Aviv University, Winter 2000, published in Twentieth Century Literature Volume 46, <http://www.findarticles.com/p/articles/mi_m0403/is_4_46/ai_75141042>)

In the secular apocalyptic visions that have proliferated wildly in the last 200 years, the world has been destroyed by nuclear wars, alien invasions, climatic changes, social upheavals, meteor strikes, and technological shutdowns. These baroque scenarios are shaped by the eroticism of disaster. The apocalyptic desire that finds satisfaction in elaborating fictions of the End is double-edged. On the one hand, its ultimate object is some version of the crystalline New Jerusalem, an image of purity so absolute that it denies the organic messiness of life. [1] On the other hand, apocalyptic fictions typically linger on pain and suffering. The end result of apocalyptic purification often seems of less importance than the narrative pleasure derived from the bizarre and opulent tribulations of the bodies being burnt by fire and brimstone, tormented by scorpion stings, trodden like grapes in the winepress. In this interplay between the incorporeal purity of the ends and the violent corporeality of the means the apocalyptic body is born. It is a body whose mortal sickness is a precondition of ultimate health, whose grotesque and excessive sexuality issues in angelic sexlessness, and whose torture underpins a painless--and lifeless--millennium.The apocalyptic body is perverse, points out Tina Pippin, unstable and mutating from maleness to femaleness and back again, purified by the sadomasochistic "bloodletting on the cross," trembling in abject terror while awaiting an unearthly consummation (122). But most of all it is a suffering body, a text written in the script of stigmata, scars, wounds, and sores. Any apocalypse strikes the body politic like a disease, progressing from the first symptoms of a large-scale disaster through the crisis of the tribulation to the recovery of the millennium. But of all the Four Horsemen, the one whose ride begins most intimately, in the private travails of individual flesh, and ends in the devastation of the entire community, is the last one, Pestilence. The contagious body is the most characteristic modality of apocalyptic corporeality. At the same time, I will argue, it contains a counterapocalyptic potential, resisting the dangerous lure of Endism, the ideologically potent combination of "apocalyptic terror", a nd "millennial perfection" (Quinby 2). This essay, a brief sketch of the poetics and politics of the contagious body, does not attempt a comprehensive overview of the historical development of the trope of pestilence. Nor does it limit itself to a particular disease, along the lines of Susan Sontag's classic delineation of the poetics of TB and many subsequent attempts to develop a poetics of AIDS. Rather, my focus is on the general narrativity of contagion and on the way the plague-stricken body is manipulated within the overall plot of apocalyptic millennialism, which is a powerful ideological current in twentieth-century political history, embracing such diverse manifestations as religious fundamentalism, Nazism, and other forms of "radical desperation" (Quinby 4--5). Thus, I consider both real and imaginary diseases, focusing on the narrative construction of the contagious body rather than on the precise epidemiology of the contagion. All apocalyptic and millenarian ideologies ultimately converge on the utopian transformation of the body (and the body politic) through suffering. But pestilence offers a uniquely ambivalent modality of corporeal apocalypse. On the one hand, it may be appropriated to the standard plot of apocalyptic purification as a singularly atrocious technique of separating the damned from the saved. Thus, the plague becomes a metaphor for genocide, functioning as such both in Mein Kampf and in Camus's The Plague.[2] On the other hand, the experience of a pandemic undermines the giddy hopefulness of Endism. Since everybody is a potential victim, the line between the pure and the impure can never be drawn with any precision. Instead of delivering the climactic moment of the Last Judgment, pestilence lingers on, generating a limbo of common suffering in which a tenuous and moribund but all-embracing body politic springs into being. The end is indefinitely postponed and the disease becomes a metaphor for the process of livi ng. The finality of mortality clashes with the duration of morbidity. Pestilence is poised on the cusp between divine punishment and manmade disaster. On the one hand, unlike nuclear war or ecological catastrophe, pandemic has a venerable historical pedigree that leads back from current bestsellers such as Pierre Quellette's The Third Pandemic (1996) to the medieval horrors of the Black Death and indeed to the Book of Revelation itself. On the other hand, disease is one of the central tropes of biopolitics, shaping much of the twentieth-century discourse of power, domination, and the body. Contemporary plague narratives, including the burgeoning discourse of AIDS, are caught between two contrary textual impulses: acquiescence in a (super) natural judgment and political activism. Their impossible combination produces a clash of two distinct plot modalities. In his contemporary incarnations the Fourth Horseman vacillates between the voluptuous entropy of indiscriminate killing and the genocidal energy directed at specific categories of victims. As Richard Dellamora points out in his gloss on Derrida, apocalypse in general may be used "in order to validate violence done to others" while it may also function as a modality of total resistance to the existing order (3). But my concern here is not so much with the difference between "good" and "bad" apocalypses (is total extinction "better" than selective genocide?) as with the interplay of eschatology and politics in the construction of the apocalyptic body.